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Preface
In my childhood many decades ago my
grandmother kept insisting that my lineal
ancestor Oliver Ellsworth had been one of
our nation’s truly great Founding Fathers.
Later my mother picked up the cause, and
as I matured as a teacher in the field of
English, she persistently suggested that
it might be interesting for me to apply my
interpretive skills to explain his remarkable
accomplishment. If I could totally dismember
a poem or novel, it might be almost as
easy to recombine Ellsworth’s wonderful
accomplishment, since he had somehow
done very important things. Nobody seemed
to recognize this, but there was no doubt
about his remarkable success.
To appease my mother’s persistence,
I finally looked into Ellsworth’s various
accomplishments, only to find that they
were quite remarkable. I pored over his only
biography, William Garrott Brown’s The
life of Oliver Ellsworth, published in 1905,
to find that indeed Ellsworth had played a
pivotal role in our nation’s inception, and

x

that nobody seemed to have any idea how
this might have happened—not even my
mother and deceased grandmother, not even
William Garrott Brown, whatever the merits
of his research.
My brief article appropriately
published by the Daughters of the American
Revolution, was insufficient to provoke any
interest in the issue, so I doubled down
my research with heavy dependence on
Farrand’s remarkable four-volume Records
of the Federalist Convention of 1787, as well
as Elliot’s Debates and several other texts
by old-fashioned constitutional historians.
After sustained inquiry, I was able to
publish my 93-page paper, “An Accidental
Conspiracy: The Early History of Judicial
Review from the Constitutional Convention
to the 1789 Judiciary Act and Marbury v.
Madison.” Unfortunately, the festschrift in
which it was published died aborning and,
worse yet, my aging mother complained that
my information was totally unclear to her.
Nowadays, a couple decades later, I
find myself making comparable claims about
Ellsworth’s remarkable accomplishment
with my own assortment of grandchildren,
and they seem impervious to the pedantry
I flaunt to “explicate” constitutional history.
As a result, I have taken the liberty to compile
another relatively brief assessment, “Oliver
Ellsworth’s Essential Role, etc.” in which I
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have boiled down his pivotal achievement
to nine components worthy of explanation,
then suggested several reasons how and
why his historic role might have been so
completely ignored. This I have passed
around among friends and relatives without
trying to submit it for publication.
It was only this winter that it occurred
to me that an even better approach would
be to combine this recent essay with my
earlier and more thorough piece under the
original title, “Accidental Conspiracy.” The
recent essay would feature a clear and
relatively simple explanation of Ellsworth’s
achievement, setting the stage for the
judicious reader’s encounter with the larger
text that remains more thorough in tracing
the complex relationships involved among
our nation’s Founding Fathers.
Unfortunately, much of this interaction
goes unnoticed among most of today’s
constitutional historians. Modern ideological
preconceptions almost exclusively devoted
to civil rights have so completely clouded
earlier issues that what actually happened
two hundred-thirty years ago has long since
dissolved into the penumbra of ignored
history.
Here, then, is a major fragment of
“real” narrative—a far more interesting
chain of events in my opinion than the
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topical substitute taught in respectable
universities. As compared to the poems and
novels I have dissected in my career as an
academic critic, I do take pride in having
reconstructed my seventh generation greatgrandfather’s remarkable achievement
toward the creation of the United States.
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Introduction
Our nation’s Founding Fathers
supposedly included Washington, Franklin,
Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and Adams,
not to overlook the initial role of Paine
in helping to encourage the American
Revolution. A second tier of leaders included
such eminent figures as George Mason,
Richard Henry Lee, Edmund Randolph, and
Patrick Henry of Virginia; James Wilson,
Robert Morris, and Gouverneur Morris of
Pennsylvania; John Jay of New York; John
Dickinson of Delaware; William Paterson
of New Jersey; John Rutledge of South
Carolina; Samuel Adams of Massachusetts;
and Roger Sherman of Connecticut.
Also from Connecticut but too often
ignored was Oliver Ellsworth, whose
depiction as an austere figure addicted to
snuff gave him a comic aspect occasionally
featured by historic accounts to offset the
stern intentions of everybody else. Yet
Ellsworth’s role was at least as important, if
not more so.
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Today Ellsworth’s official biography
seems relatively devoid of interest in most
of the appropriate encyclopedias. They
list his having served in the Continental
Congress, having been a judge both for the
Continental Congress and on Connecticut’s
state superior court, having participated
in the Constitutional Convention until his
unexplained departure three weeks before
it was signed, having served in the Senate
during Washington’s presidency, and having
been the third chief justice of the Supreme
Court without having provided any major
decisions.
He is also now and again remembered
for having authored the popular Letters to a
Landholder supportive of the Constitution,
for having dominated proceedings in
Connecticut’s ratifying convention, and
for having led a failed diplomatic mission
to France in order to avoid naval warfare
against Napoleon. Unfortunately, it can
be added that Elllsworth’s journey to and
from France was beset with heavy seas, and
Ellsworth contracted an illness that obliged
his withdrawal from public life. He died in
1806 at the age of sixty-two. This summary
of his career is indeed accurate, but it falls
short of telling the full story—a remarkable
story that is almost entirely unknown today.
Listed here are nine reasons how and
why Ellsworth played an essential role—
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perhaps the most essential role of all—in the
creation of the United States.
Naming the Nation To Be
First, and probably least important,
it was Ellsworth who gave our nation the
name of The United States. Preceding the
Constitutional Convention, Paine, Jefferson,
and others all spoke of the united states in
generic terms such as “the unified states”
or “the group of states.” At the Convention,
delegates from the large states kept talking
of the “nation,” but as a small-state delegate
Ellsworth preferred the earlier description
as a unified group rather than a single unit
necessarily dominated by the large states.
So why not describe the group as before,
Ellsworth seems to have suggested, but with
the article the imbedded in the name and with
use of capital letters—“the United States”?
On June 20, 1787, Ellsworth proposed this
change in his very first recorded contribution
at the Convention beyond having seconded
a couple of motions by Sherman, his fellow
Connecticut delegate.
Support for this official name turned
out to be unanimous among fellow delegates.
Later, while authoring the final draft of the
Constitution, Gouverneur Morris added
the words, “of America,” to produce the full
wording accepted today, The United States
of America. What seems remarkable about
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Ellsworth’s contribution is that having
provided the United States with its name
he was as effective as anybody in having
created a system of government suitable to
its fullest implications.
The Connecticut Compromise
Second, Sherman, Johnson, and
Ellsworth successfully promoted the socalled Connecticut Compromise that broke
the deadlock between the large and small
states about representation in Congress.
The large states wanted proportional
representation that would guarantee them
a majority of legislators as compared to the
small states. On the other hand, the small
states wanted equal representation that gave
them just as many representatives—two
apiece—as the large states. The trade-off they
finally made was a bicameral arrangement
whereby the House of Representatives
exercised proportional representation while
the Senate exercised equal representation.
Ellsworth himself proposed the plan
finally accepted whereby members of the
House of Representatives would be elected
by popular vote and members of the Senate
would be elected by state legislatures.
The interests of a state’s populace would
presumably be emphasized in the House of
Representatives, while the interests of its
political leadership would be emphasized
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in the Senate. Much later the Seventeenth
Amendment rejected this arrangement in
favor of using the popular vote for both the
Senate and House of Representatives. Far
more important, however, was the fact that
the Constitutional Convention was on the
brink of dissolving, and the Connecticut
Compromise based on Ellsworth’s proposal
was acceptable to a majority of delegates
and thus kept the Convention alive. Without
this compromise the Convention would have
failed.
Slavery in the Beginning
Third, crucial to the success of the
Connecticut Compromise was a less
publicized compromise between the small
northern states and the three states
from the deep south—Georgia and the
two Carolinas—which were prepared to
abandon the Convention if slavery was not
written into the Constitution. As a result,
a trade-off was essential between the small
northern states’ toleration of slavery in the
Constitution and, more specifically, their
support of a three-fifths-population count for
slaves in southern states in exchange for the
southern states’ support of the Connecticut
Compromise. Without this secondary tradeoff, the Connecticut Compromise was not
possible and the Convention was effectively
doomed.
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It turned out that Georgia’s delegates
voted against the Connecticut Compromise
anyway, but this did not matter, since the
two Carolinas provided just enough votes
for the needed majority. All delegates from
the small northern states cooperated with
this tacit arrangement, but it was Ellsworth
alone who actually accepted the distasteful
obligation to stand before the Convention
on August 17 and 22, the latter on his final
day at the Convention, to remind fellow
delegates of the need to write slavery into
the Constitution. His words featured the
importance of states rights, as explained
by Madison: “Let every state import as it
pleases. The morality or wisdom of slavery
are considerations belonging to the states
themselves.”
Ellsworth had no slaves of his own,
but he actively promoted the compromise
because it was crucial in the creation of the
United States.
Committee of Detail
Fourth, because of his active role at the
Convention, Ellsworth was elected to the
Committee of Detail (described by Madison
as the Committee of Five) with four other
Convention delegates: John Rutledge of
South Carolina, Edmund Randolph of
Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and
Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. Their
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task on this Committee was to combine in a
single preliminary draft of the Constitution
the twenty-two resolutions that had been
gathered from the Virginia Plan, the New
Jersey Plan, the Pinckney Plan, and various
other proposals along with amendments
passed on the convention floor.
The rest of the Convention took a
vacation from July 26 to August 6 while
these five delegates spent ten days in
confronting this solemn task. Later during
the Convention they kept meeting with each
other to incorporate new amendments into
their basic draft of the Constitution. The
only record of proceedings by the Committee
of Detail during the initial ten-day period
additional to the Constitution itself were the
written rough drafts by Rutledge, Randolph
and Wilson. However, it is important to note
that these drafts alone are not a particularly
useful indication of what individuals
dominated proceedings, since the three
identified as their authors might have done
little more than serve as amanuenses for the
others as they argued the words and ideas
under consideration.
More indicative of the level of input by
participants during the Committee of Detail’s
sessions would have been their contributions
to debate during the Convention afterwards
to clarify their intentions while compiling
the document. Ellsworth turns out to
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have been the most outspoken during his
seventeen days of attendance preceding his
sudden departure from the Convention after
August 24.
Having been silent for as many as three
weeks after his arrival at the Convention,
Ellsworth was reported by Madison to
have made 53 contributions during his
attendance after the Convention reconvened
as compared to 49 contributions by Wilson,
30 by Randolph, 25 by Rutledge, and 20 by
Gorham during the same period of days. In
fact, Ellsworth spoke up more than anybody
else on the floor except for Madison (55)
and Gouverneur Morris (59). It is to be
conceded that Ellsworth’s contributions
were usually brief as recorded by Madison,
but he was obviously trying to clarify the
Committee of Detail’s intentions rather
than proposing anything new that required
greater elaboration.
In effect the brevity of Ellsworth’s
remarks very likely suggests he had assumed
the role on the floor of the Convention in
explaining the implications of the choices
made by the Committee of Detail, further
suggesting that he himself played a major
role in obtaining these results. Gorham’s
contribution would seem to have been
relatively modest, and Randolph’s later
refusal to sign the Constitution because
he suspected skullduggery was involved
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would suggest his alienation from others
on the committee—as might well have been
justified in light of Wilson, Rutledge, and
Ellsworth’s later contributions to debate.
What can be seen in retrospect as having
been a coordinated effort among these
three delegates both during the Committee
of Detail and during Convention afterwards
would therefore be suggested, if not totally
confirmed, by Madison’s Notes published in
1840, four years after his death.
Federal Sovereignty Postponed
Fifth, and perhaps most important,
Ellsworth along with Rutledge and Wilson
effectively postponed giving the federal
government its sovereign authority over
the rights of all the state governments.
If they had written this authority into the
Constitution, it would have been rejected at
the Convention, to say nothing of the state
ratifying conventions. Under the Articles
of Confederation, our nation’s central
government had lacked this authority,
and during the Convention most of the
delegates made it plain they were still
unwilling to concede it. Ellsworth himself
was actually quoted by Madison as having
declared as late as August 20, “The U.S. are
sovereign on one side of the line dividing
the jurisdictions—the States on the other—
each ought to have power to defend their
respective sovereignties.”
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However, an enforceable priority
favorable to federal authority was
obviously needed between state and
federal government, and the review of state
laws by Congress was no longer possible.
Four times Madison had submitted an
amendment on the floor of the Convention
giving the national legislature the right
of congressional review in revoking state
laws found to be unconstitutional. When
Madison first proposed his amendment it
was quickly accepted with a unanimous
vote, but it was later reconsidered and
defeated three times in a row, the last time—
after intensive politicking on the floor—by
a single vote that made it obvious that the
sides were deadlocked and nothing better
was obtainable.
The possibility of substituting judicial
review for congressional review had been
mentioned among a few of the delegates off
the floor of the Convention, but this was a
brand new concept relevant to the issue of
national sovereignty, and Ellsworth and the
rest on the Committee of Detail seems to
have excluded it from consideration during
their meetings. Their reasoning was justified
by the fact that it had not been mentioned
in any of the resolutions submitted for
inclusion in the Constitution. The question
remains whether this omission might also
have been considered useful in helping to
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postpone the implementation of judicial
review until a later time.
The stance of Wilson, Rutledge, and
Ellsworth relevant to the possibility of
judicial review seems to have become much
more supportive by August 23, toward
the end of the Convention. When it was
proposed that one further attempt be made
to add the congressional review of state
laws to the Constitution, Madison resisted
the suggestion, saying, “He had been from
the beginning a friend to the principle; but
thought the modification might be made
better.”
In retrospect it seems more than likely
that Madison used this particular word
“modification” to refer to judicial review,
since this was in fact the only feasible
alternative to congressional review that
was finally implemented. After two other
delegates expressed their opposition to
another vote upon congressional review,
Wilson could not help himself and took the
floor to insist on the need to impose federal
authority in the judgment of state laws:
“that the firmness of justices is not of itself
sufficient. Something further is requisite.”
Obviously, in light of his later efforts, he
was suggesting an arrangement whereby
state judicial decisions, regardless of the
“firmness” of state justices in their loyalty
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to the Constitution, could be examined and
reversed at a higher level.
Rutledge and Ellsworth immediately
challenged Wilson’s proposal, as they already
had on August 15 regarding the judicial
review of federal law passed by Congress.
Here, it seems, they wanted every aspect of
the issue to be kept out of deliberations in
order to avoid the rejection of judicial review
comparable to the rejection of congressional
review. Rutledge’s words were plain enough:
“If nothing else, this alone would damn and
ought to damn the Constitution. Will any
state ever agree to be bound hand & foot in
this manner?”
Ellsworth immediately followed with
his next-to-last speech before his departure
from the Convention, in which he limited
his discussion to legislative and executive
review with no suggestion of the possibility of
judicial review. In retrospect, it seems more
than likely that both Rutledge and Ellsworth
fully agreed with Wilson’s insistence on the
need for federal review, if possible through
the use of the judiciary, but that they were
convinced the issue was best postponed
until after the Constitution had been ratified.
Rutledge was meanwhile doing everything
needed to revise the Constitution for the
later imposition of judicial review, and it was
Ellsworth who finally authored the Judiciary
Act to impose judicial review.

13

Among the several amendments that
turned out to be useful toward the later
implementation of judicial review, Rutledge’s
June 5 motion against permanent inferior
federal courts necessitated giving federal
status to state courts for this purpose, and
his August 23 amendment requiring all state
judges to declare their oath of allegiance to
the Constitution made possible an appeals
system whereby state laws could be reviewed
by federal judges.
Also useful was the so-called
“supremacy clause” suggested by the New
Jersey Plan to establish the Constitution plus
all treaties and federal laws as the supreme
law of the land for all judges in every state.
Luther Martin later promoted this clause
in order to guarantee the independent
sovereignty of state constitutions, and on
August 23 Rutledge proposed it again with
its full wording. As such the Committee of
Detail later wrote it into Article VI of the
Constitution. It clearly established the
priority of the federal Constitution over
all state constitutions and state laws, but
without clarifying how this authority could
be exercised.
The crucial expedient to make possible
a postponement of the adoption of judicial
review was provided by the “assignment
clause” first mentioned in Article 9 of the
Virginia Plan. The clause was later imbedded
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in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:
“with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make.”
This gave Congress sufficient latitude at a
later time both to grant state courts their
authority subsidiary to the federal Supreme
Court and finally, and just as important, to
grant the federal Supreme Court its power
of veto over state supreme court decisions.
As Wilson, Rutledge, and Ellsworth must
have realized from the beginning, any law to
establish the appropriate hierarchy among
these courts would necessarily include the
procedures relevant to the operation of
this hierarchy, and herein the principle of
judicial review could be implemented if not
exactly declared.
Interestingly, both Ellsworth and
Wilson seemed sufficiently confident
of support for the Constitution at their
respective state ratifying conventions just
a few months after the Convention to have
taken the opportunity to speak favorably
of the possibility of using judicial review in
defense of federal sovereignty.
Here, then, was palpable evidence
of exactly the “takeover” conspiracy that
Randolph, Martin, and others sought
to prevent. Wilson declared, “If a law
should be made inconsistent with those
powers bestowed by this instrument [the
Constitution] in Congress, the judges,
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as a consequence of their independence,
and the particular powers of government
being defined, will declare such law to
be null and void. For the power of the
constitution predominates.” Similarly,
Ellsworth declared, “If the states go beyond
their limits, if they make a law which is a
usurpation upon the federal government the
law is void; and upright, independent judges
will declare it to be so.” It was as simple
as that—but something that could not
have been mentioned at the Constitutional
Convention itself.
Senate Majority Leader
Sixth, having been elected to the very
first session of the U.S. Senate, Ellsworth
quickly assumed the role of its de facto
Senate Majority leader, and indignant
reports of fellow senators such as Maclay
and Burr made it plain that Ellsworth’s
leadership verged on legislative tyranny. Not
surprisingly, his first and most important
task (“Senate Bill Number 1” of the first
session of the U.S. Senate) was to write
the Judiciary Act and obtain its passage as
mandated by the Constitution’s assignment
clause.
Some senators vigorously opposed the
bill, Maclay, for example, having described
as “a vile law system, calculated for expense
and with a design to draw by degree all
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law business into the Federal courts.”
Other senators were more cooperative with
Ellsworth, most notably Paterson, his college
friend and fellow delegate at the Convention,
but the overwhelming consensus among
everybody involved, including Madison, who
was serving in the House of Representatives,
was that Ellsworth was the single dominant
author of the Act.
What Ellsworth achieved almost entirely
on his own was of crucial importance to the
functional success of our nation:
•

He established a functional vertical
hierarchy of federal and state
courts,

•

He confirmed the authority of the
Supreme Court at the very top, and

•

He installed all state courts, no
matter how small, within the system
below. Without exception these
courts retained their status and
authority at their respective levels,
and their decisions relevant to the
Constitution were subject to appeal
to the state supreme courts, and
then, if challenged, to the nation’s
Supreme Court itself.

The most important component of the
Act was Section 25, which included exactly
two sentences—a short one introduced by
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somebody else that had little impact followed
by a gargantuan 307-word sentence that
could only have been composed by Ellsworth
himself to obscure the law in the very act of
putting it into effect:
[Be it enacted,] That a final judgment
or decree in any suit, in the highest
court of law or equity of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be
had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an
authority exercised under, the United
States, and the decision is against
their validity; or where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute
of, or an authority exercised under,
any state, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such
their validity, or where is drawn in
question the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission
held under, the United States, and
the decision is against the title, right,
privilege, or exemption, specially set
up or claimed by either party, under
such clause of the said Constitution,
treaty, statute or commission, may be
reexamined, and reversed or affirmed
by the Supreme Court of the United
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States upon a writ of error, the citation
being signed by the chief justice,
or judge or chancellor of the court
rendering or passing the judgment
or decree complained of, or by a
justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the same manner
and under the same regulations, and
the writ shall have the same effect as
if the judgment or decree complained
of had been rendered or passed in
a circuit court, and the proceedings
upon the reversal shall also be the
same, except that the Supreme Court,
instead of remanding the cause for
a final decision as before provided,
may, at their discretion, if the cause
shall have been once remanded
before, proceed to a final decision of
the same, and award execution.
Truly, the sentence speaks for itself.
Its original draft seems to have been in the
handwriting of a clerk, but its principal
author—very likely its only author—was
undoubtedly Ellsworth, as confirmed by
its intentional complexity. Section 25
established the unique principle that any
state law decided by a state supreme court
could then be appealed to the federal Supreme
Court if and only if the state supreme court
has rendered a positive judgment.
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Significantly, if a state supreme court
rejected a law or lower court decision, its
judgment could not be appealed to the federal
Supreme Court. Only when a state supreme
court arrived at a favorable decision that was
appealed to the Supreme Court could the
latter reverse this decision. This seemingly
limited use of judicial review entailed what
might have seemed a major compromise at
the time. It imposed federal sovereignty, and
at the same time it conceded states’ rights
on a limited basis. It assigns to state courts
alone the power to originate legal action
ultimately decided by the federal Supreme
Court, and it gives state supreme courts
first opportunity to negate a law that might
otherwise be appealed for adjudication at a
higher level.
In other words all of the state courts’
negative decisions stand as decided without
any opportunity for higher appeal. Only
positive decisions can be negated. The
arrangement seemed to enlarge the authority
of state courts as compared to federal courts,
though the federal advantage later became
plain as legal precedents accumulated over
future years.
More inclusively, Section 25 provided
exactly the enabling feature for federal
sovereignty that had been missing from
both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution itself. As was the case with
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judicial review, federal authority as a whole
was accordingly limited in the beginning, but
it has steadily mounted from the cumulative
impact of its multitude of interactive
decisions over the twenty-two decades that
have followed. Exactly who conceived of this
arrangement? With no other candidates to
be suggested, one must assume Ellsworth
played a singular role in imposing this
compromise, and probably without any
clear idea how it would advance upon itself.
It is also important to recognize that
Ellsworth’s sentence afforded the federal
government its sovereignty over state
governments in all matters of law relevant
to the Constitution. As such it is arguably
the single most important feature of the
Constitution—except of course that it is
paradoxically nowhere to be found in this
document. Instead, its guarantee of federal
sovereignty was relegated to a barely
decipherable segment of verbiage that was
hardly mentioned in debate upon the passage
of the Judiciary Act in either the Senate or
House of Representatives. It was almost as
if its neglect was the product of avoidance
as a shared goal among everybody involved.
Nobody seemed to mind that Section 25
entailed obvious tautology, since it secured
the final authority of the Constitution,
while the Constitution guaranteed the rule
of federal law as spelled out by Section 25.
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Niggling issues such as this could be ignored
once the task had been completed—a
constitution defended by a mere federal law
that everybody depended on but nobody
quite understood.
It accordingly seems probable that
Section 25 was written to be overlooked, and,
if and when it was specifically examined, it
was sufficiently confusing to be ignored. It
was buried in the text, positioned twentyfifth in sequence among the sections, and
its most cursory inspection discloses almost
breathtaking stylistic demands compared
to the Constitution’s lucid prose style in its
final draft by Gouverneur Morris.
Ellsworth himself was able to write
with clarity as exemplified in his Landholder
series, and it cannot be ignored that he
had participated in the early authorship
of the Constitution. Even the rest of the
Judiciary Act is relatively lucid. However,
in having authored the second sentence of
Section 25 in its entirety, Ellsworth obtained
exactly the needed results, as seems to
have been his intention. For in fact the
Judiciary Act involved controversial issues
that were still potentially disastrous to the
establishment of the federal government two
years after the Constitutional Convention.
Not only did it impose a vertical hierarchy
giving a crucial role to state courts, but
it also went one step further in Section

22

25 by using this hierarchy to impose a
compromise that guaranteed effective
federal sovereignty despite the concerns
of a formidable minority of anti-nationalist
Americans. What might be described as
judicious obscurity was therefore in order,
and with such effectiveness that even today
there are scholars who mistakenly ascribe
the achievement of judicial review to Chief
Justice Marshall’s 1803 Marbury v. Madison
decision rather than the Judiciary Act.
Simultaneous Successes
Seventh, Madison obtained passage
of the Bill of Rights in the House of
Representatives at about the same time
as Ellsworth obtained passage of the
Judiciary Act in the Senate. Then the two
of them switched roles. Ellsworth sponsored
Madison’s Bill of Rights in the Senate
at the same time as Madison sponsored
Ellsworth’s Judiciary Act in the House
of Representatives. It seems more than
likely that this presumably coincidental
occurrence was coordinated, for in fact the
two acts complemented each other. The
Judiciary Act established federal authority
to reject state laws at odds with federal laws,
and the Bill of Rights specified individual
freedoms as well as state and local decisions
that could not be infringed on by federal
authority vested in the Supreme Court.
Each of these Acts both limited and helped
to define the other.
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Senate Leadership
Eighth, Ellsworth’s dominant role in
the Senate was essential to the success
of Washington’s two terms in office. As
the nation’s vice president for eight years,
John Adams was the presiding officer of
the Senate, and in his opinion based on
having observed Ellsworth’s performance
in the Senate, he was “the firmest pillar of
Washington’s administration.”
Among Ellsworth’s accomplishments,
he obtained the passage of Hamilton’s
complete economic program for funding
the national debt, assuming state debts,
and establishing a United States bank. The
only modifications were limited to the minor
suggestions by Ellsworth himself. He also
initiated the strategy of sending the Jay
mission to England in order to avert war. It
was a novel idea that had not occurred to
Washington.
All in all, Ellsworth’s dominance in
the Senate guaranteed its full support of
Washington’s policies despite increasing
factionalism elsewhere in the government.
So it was probably the biggest mistake
in Ellsworth’s career to become Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. Without his
presence, the Senate could no longer anchor
Federalist policy, and as much as anything
this weakness may be recognized as having
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contributed to the limited success of the
Adams presidency. In the words of Adams to
his wife Abigail on March 5, 1796, “Yesterday
Mr. Ellsworth’s Nomination was consented
to as Chief Justice, by which we loose [sic]
the clearest head and most diligent hand we
had.”
Napoleon’s Gift
And ninth, Ellsworth’s contribution as
the third Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
turned out to be relatively inconsequential,
overshadowed by that of his successor, John
Marshall. It might accordingly seem to have
been a blessing that Ellsworth was chosen to
lead a delegation to France in 1800 in order
to negotiate a treaty (or “convention”) with
Napoleon, thereby ending undeclared naval
hostilities between France and the United
States. Just as the Jay mission had patched
up relations with England, Ellsworth’s
mission was intended to obtained similar
results with France.
Ellsworth and Napoleon seem to have
been impressed with each other, Napoleon
having said when he first saw Ellsworth,
“We must make a treaty with this man.”
Napoleon was reported to have become
even more impressed with Ellsworth’s
fellow envoy, William Davie, but whatever
the relationship, the final treaty seemed to
give Napoleon everything he wanted with
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few concessions to American interests.
American public response was furious,
compounding its anger about Adams’ use of
the Alien and Sedition Act. As a result the
Federalists were readily defeated in the 1800
election. In bad health because of his voyage
to France, Ellsworth retired from national
politics at the same time as the Federalist
Party was driven from politics, and he ceased
to play a major role in our nation’s history.
Why, then, can this particular episode
with Napoleon be included among Ellsworth’s
major contributions to the creation of our
nation? Just three years later, Napoleon
was confronted with a variety of major
decisions, and despite mounting antagonism
with Jefferson’s administration, he all of
a sudden made a spontaneous gift of the
Louisiana Purchase to the United States.
The cost of $15 million he charged was very
little compared to the value of the territory
even at that time. The United States actually
doubled in size, and the total expenditure
amounted to approximately four cents per
acre.
Of course there is no way of proving
this, but the possibility seems more than
likely that Napoleon had in mind Ellsworth,
Davie, and the rest of the U.S. mission when
he made this gift. They had bestowed on him
a generous treaty, and he in turn just might
have reciprocated with an enormous transfer
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of land to the United States. Napoleon’s
personal gifts to Ellsworth at the Ellsworth
Homestead in Windsor, Connecticut, are
modest but tasteful, suggesting at least the
possibility of mutual respect that just might
have doubled our nation’s total size at the
time.
Having provided the United States
with its name, Ellsworth was as successful
as anybody in having unified the nation’s
system of government suitable to its name.
Why Has Ellsworth’s Role Been Forgotten?
First and foremost, Ellsworth tended
to be aloof in his relations with others. His
hostile fellow Senator McClain described him
as being obstinate, conceited, and, worst of
all, uncandid—in fact just about the most
dishonest man he had ever met. He was
constantly parlaying in back halls additional
to his speeches before the Senate. Ellsworth
also seemed almost a caricature of himself
much of the time—tall, stiff, arrogant, and
addicted to snuff, traces of which could
usually be seen on his clothing.
As Adams explained with a backhanded
compliment in the letter to his wife already
quoted,
Though Ellsworth has the Stiffness of
Connecticut: though His Air and Gilt
are not elegant: though he cannot
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enter a Room nor retire from it with
the Ease and Grace of a Courtier: Yet
his Understanding is as sound, his
Information as good and his heart as
steady as any Man can boast.
Ellsworth’s problem was that many
of his contemporaries had comparable
understanding without a similar deficiency
in the graces. Ellsworth could effectively
carry a debate, sometimes with extraordinary
aggressiveness, and he could just as
effectively collaborate with fellow delegates
at the Convention and with fellow Senators
in Congress. However, his personal relations
with others seem to have been standoffish
unless he was negotiating political choices
at the time.
There is little evidence of Ellsworth
having had close friendships with fellow
public servants beyond his college companion
Paterson and his mentor Sherman. At times
he worked closely with such figures as
Wilson, Rutledge, and Madison, yet Madison
was quoted as having said toward the end
of his life that despite his high respect
for Ellsworth there had never been any
exchange of letters.
In 1789 Washington traveled into New
England and actually visited Ellsworth’s
home in Windsor, Connecticut, but he
only spent “near an hour” with him and
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his family and then traveled on to spend
the night elsewhere. The most memorable
aspect of Washington’s visit was his having
supposedly dandled Ellsworth’s twin sons
Billy and Harry on his knees while singing
the “Ballad of Derby Ram.” In retrospect,
this short a visit was both an honor and
insult after the cooperative relationship
between the two both during and after the
Constitutional Convention.
Secondly, there is little record of
Ellsworth’s speeches and publications
except for the Landholder series. Madison
made an effort to summarize his remarks
on the floor of the Convention preceding the
Committee of Detail, but he increasingly
tallied Ellsworth’s contributions rather
than spelling them out. Likewise, there was
no record whatsoever for the crucial ten
days Ellsworth spent with the Committee
of Detail, nor was there adequate record of
Ellsworth’s speeches and motions during
the eight years he spent in the Senate.
Moreover, because the Senate provided
Washington with automatic support,
modern historians focus on the story of his
two terms in office relevant to what was
happening elsewhere in his administration,
most notably the House of Representatives.
Nor does there seem to have been any record
of Ellsworth’s negotiations with the French
in 1800. He seems to have thrived during
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private consultation free of public scrutiny,
but as a result his historic contribution is
more difficult to ascertain in retrospect. We
are left with little more than a sampling of his
prose except for the transcript of his defense
of the Constitution at the Connecticut
Ratifying Convention, his energetic 1787
Letters to a Landholder, written in defense of
the Constitution, and his tortuous exercise
in obscurity in Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act. In sum, Ellsworth’s contribution was
insufficiently documented compared to that
of his more prominent contemporaries.
As a third explanation, neither the
American public nor its historians enjoy the
thought that conspiracy and opportunistic
trade-offs might have played a major role at
the very inception of our nation. Ellsworth’s
historic contribution unfortunately featured
more than one such transgressions, most
obviously in promoting slavery in order to
implement the Connecticut Compromise
and then in excluding judicial review from
the Constitution so it might be added once
the Constitution was fully ratified. Nor
is it comfortable for orthodox American
historians to recognize that the enabling act
that secured federal sovereignty was nothing
more than a law slipped into passage with
almost no debate whatsoever.
What later generations wanted to
emphasize about the origins of our nation
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were the clean and principled achievements
of such figures as Washington, Franklin,
and Jefferson, not the often disingenuous
interplay among Ellsworth, Wilson, Rutledge,
and even Madison, all of whom were more
directly involved in the formation of our
nation’s constitutional government.
The fourth and perhaps most important
explanation is that Ellsworth became a
favorite of antebellum Southern statesmen
such as Clay and Calhoun because of his
defense of slavery at the Constitutional
Convention as well as his restricted
application of judicial review that limited
the origin of constitutional issues to state
courts and with only the positive rulings of
state supreme courts subject to repeal by
the Supreme Court. At first this might have
seemed a minor concession to the small
states, but it was later considered essential
among states rights proponents.
Before the twenty-ninth Congress,
Calhoun actually praised Ellsworth along
with Sherman and Paterson for having
created the United States as a federal
instead of a national government: “But to
the coolness and sagacity of these three
men, aided by others not so prominent, do
we owe our present constitution” (Brown,
165). Unfortunately, Calhoun spoke as
a southern leader, and among the slave
states Ellsworth’s judicial compromise
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was considered useful to the extent that it
encouraged the toleration of slavery without
federal intervention. If, for example, state
supreme courts avoided making positive
decisions relevant to slavery, nothing
could be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Significantly, the Constitution drafted by
the southern states during the Civil War
duplicated the original Constitution except
in having increased both its defense of states
rights and the legalization of slavery, two of
the issues that could be rightly or wrongly
identified with Ellsworth’s intentions.
And fifth, Ellsworth’s judicial priorities
ceased to be considered important after
the Civil War. With the victory of the union
armies, the North imposed the Fourteenth
Amendment, requiring all state and local
laws to abide by the Bill of Rights as
finally interpreted by the Supreme Court.
As a result, the initial effort of Ellsworth,
Madison, and others to secure a viable
balance between states’ rights and federal
authority ceased to have much relevance
to our nation’s future. Initially, the Bill of
Rights (Madison’s contribution) had been
intended to protect state and local authority
as well as individual rights against federal
intrusion such as might have occurred
through the Supreme Court’s application of
judicial review (Ellsworth’s contribution).
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However, the Fourteenth Amendment
inverted this arrangement supportive of
state and local independence by permitting
the Supreme Court’s use of judicial review
to enforce the Bill of Rights at every level
of government. At first interactive on a
complementary basis, judicial review and
the Bill of Rights were accordingly integrated
on an entirely new basis once judicial review
could be used to guarantee the Bill of Rights
against state and local government as well
as the federal government.
Of course vestigial traces of federalism
are everywhere to be observed even today,
but with the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment the primary concern shifted
from interstate relations to an emphasis
on individual and corporate rights as
protected by the authority of the Supreme
Court. This expanded defense of individual
freedom` brought to the fore such issues
as the pursuit of civil rights, but it also
enlarged the possibilities for corporations on
presumably the same basis because of their
supposed “personhood.” The expansion
of their operations on a national scale as
interpreted by the Supreme Court permitted
heavy industrialization and a centralization
of banking to an extent not even Hamilton
might have anticipated. Railroads, factories,
and Wall Street speculation became
important to our nation’s destiny, as did
enlarged immigration, rapid urbanization,
labor unions, the later export of factories

33

abroad, and inevitably the relentless growth
of the federal government to deal with all
the problems both directly and indirectly
involved—wars, depressions, and the like.
Needless to say, none of this had been fully
anticipated at the time of the Constitutional
Convention.
It might be said in retrospect that
Ellsworth performed a kind of jujitsu in
having exerted the right pressure exactly
when and where needed to keep the
Constitutional Convention alive, then in
having drafted an effective Constitution,
that could later be given its teeth, and finally
in having probably doubled the size of our
nation, not that this was his intention at the
time. Then again Ellsworth might be said
to have served our nation in the capacity
of a midwife whose delivery skills could
later be ignored by future mainstream
historians insistent on an uplifting narrative
of national achievement. Infant America was
what primarily mattered, not the intricate
procedures brought into play by those who
delivered it. As a result, Ellsworth’s pivotal
contribution turned out to be what might
be described as a useful embarrassment
best overlooked in favor of the visible and
more inspiring contribution of his illustrious
contemporaries.
Nevertheless, Ellsworth’s ingenuity
was essential to the cause. When the
Constitutional Convention took place, our
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forefathers were entangled in a seemingly
inextricable conflict of interests among
quarrelsome ex-colonies. However, their
efforts led to a single powerful state—the
most powerful in the world by the midtwentieth century. Whatever his intentions,
and to whatever extent he was able to fulfill
them, Ellsworth played a central role in
having made this happen. His success was in
having established a functional unity among
these states preceding their full unification
obtained by the Civil War. To the extent
that this political achievement depended
on effective manipulation, it was Ellsworth
as much as anybody who performed this
necessary task.
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I.
An Accidental Conspiracy
In 1914 the constitutional historian
Horace Davis proposed what seemed a selfevident thesis that the Constitution’s lack
of any reference to the Supreme Court’s
power of judicial review in determining
the acceptability of both state and federal
legislation resulted from the tacit rejection
of such a process by most Convention
delegates. Simply enough, if they did not
mention judicial review, they did not want
it. These delegates presumably did this in
order to minimize the power of the courts
over both state and local governments,
thus effectively limiting their Constitutional
authority to what had already been conferred
by the Articles of Confederation. Just as
important, without judicial review the federal
government lacked full authority over state
governments, and it seems this was entirely
acceptable to most of the delegates.
In 1938, Charles Beard challenged
Davis’s thesis by documenting how the
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majority of these delegates advocated judicial
review at one time or another in their careers.
If they supported judicial review before or
afterwards, Beard argued, they cannot be
assumed to have opposed it during the
Convention. Seeking a compromise between
Davis and Beard’s position, Edward Corwin
correctly observed in 1963 that the doctrine
of judicial review existed in ovum during
the mid-seventeen eighties (Doctrine, 623),
suggesting that most, if not all, delegates
were still groping for answers about the
possibility of implementing it. Whatever
doubts they might have had about judicial
review during the Convention abated once it
was implemented.
Charles Haines shared Corwin’s thesis
and even went so far as to hint the possibility
of a conspiracy among some of the delegates
with a better sense than others of how
judicial review might be used to guarantee
federal sovereignty. Without venturing to
identify these delegates, he proposed as
early as 1932 that there had been method
in their silence:
Those who favored judicial review of
legislation frequently arrived at their
judgments because of inarticulate
assumptions or partisan political
views as to government and law and
seldom analyzed clearly the grounds
for their judgments . . . The fact of
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the matter is that judicial review of
legislation was adopted as a practical
device to meet a particular situation
by shrewd men of affairs who knew
what they wanted and who seldom
expressed clearly the reasons
which prompted their conclusions.
(American Doctrine, 204-5)
This it seems is probably the case,
but unfortunately nobody has tried to
reconstruct the effort to adopt judicial review
by these “shrewd men of affairs” during the
first two years of our republic.
Today, many constitutional historians
continue to share Beard’s assumption that
judicial review was taken for granted at the
Convention and therefore did not need to be
written into the Constitution. As a result,
many have argued, judicial review only
came into effect when Chief Justice John
Marshall adopted it in justifying his 1803
Marbury v. Madison decision. Many of the
delegates might have been aware of the
possibility of review at the Convention, but
its potential benefits very gradually came to
their attention over subsequent years, and
without any overt conspiracy having been
involved.
As Thomas Reed Powell has recently
explained, quoting Topsy from Uncle Tom’s
Cabin, “It [judicial review] just ‘growed’”
(Vagaries and Varieties, 3). With marvelous
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serendipity Hamilton indeed argued the
benefits of judicial review in chapters
belatedly added to The Federalist, and its
recognition could be detected in portions of
the Judiciary Act and early Supreme Court
decisions, but not until Marbury v. Madison
was it put to use. As a result, the single most
important instrument of federal sovereignty
cropped up almost of its own accord as an
afterthought by the Supreme Court almost
two decades after the Constitution was
adopted.
The alternative view has never been
seriously explored that judicial review was
sought by some of the Convention delegates
from the beginning and was only excluded
from the Constitution to improve its chances
of ratification. Leonard Levy, who subscribes
to the notion of judicial review’s belated
discovery, does mention this possibility of
conspiratorial supposition but quickly rejects
it because it “lacks evidentiary basis,” and
because such a postponement strategy would
have provided too “precarious a foundation”
for constitutional law as intended by our
founders (Levy, 99). In fact, most delegates
at the Convention were almost entirely
ignorant of the concept of judicial review
when they drafted the Constitution and may
be expected not to have sought a system of
government whose authority would later be
enforced by a legal procedure they did not
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fully understand. As what turned out to be
the cornerstone of constitutional law, judicial
review was therefore formulated and put into
play for the first time by Marshall when he
established the right of the Supreme Court
to veto federal laws found incompatible with
the Constitution.
Stealth Politics
What I try to demonstrate to the
contrary is that a close examination of
Madison’s Convention proceedings does in
fact provide ample evidence that a small
group of delegates shaped the Constitution
to permit the later adoption of judicial review,
but that they did this without promoting
any specific provision for judicial review.
Moreover, they probably did this to avoid
both its explicit rejection by the Convention
as a whole and/or the rejection of the entire
Constitution at state ratifying conventions.
Like Madison’s ill-fated notion of
congressional review, judicial review
would have been perceived as a nationalist
strategy to produce centralization at the
cost of state sovereignty, and this was in
fact exactly what happened. As it stands,
the Constitution barely gained passage in
several of the ratifying conventions, and
passionate debate on the issue of judicial
review might well have tipped the balance
against its acceptance. Delegates supportive
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of judicial review at the Convention were
fully aware of this likelihood, so it was their
prudent choice to resort to a postponement
strategy.
Many other delegates did in fact oppose
judicial review, and, as both Corwin and
Levy have insisted, most of them were only
beginning to fathom its potential use as an
instrument of federal sovereignty. Among
these, many sought alternatives that would
substitute for judicial review. Their repeated
effort was to minimize, if not prevent, the
use of the judiciary as an agent of national
centralization. However, resulting from
the federalist compromise wrought at
the Convention, each of their obstructive
measures was later modified to reinforce
the principle of judicial review. Rutledge and
Ellsworth, for example, began as small-state
delegates opposed to enlarging the federal
judiciary, but soon they reversed themselves
and worked even more effectively toward its
creation. The “temporary” status of federal
courts later became permanent anyway,
while the postponement in their creation led
to the Judiciary Act, a law which established
the absorption of state courts into a national
court system dominated by the Supreme
Court
Others who reversed themselves
included Sherman, Wilson, Madison, and
even Martin, who aggressively sought to
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prevent the implementation of judicial review.
Similarly, Rutledge’s June 5 amendment
dispensed with permanent inferior federal
courts in order to defend state sovereignty,
but it also led to an invaluable two-year
delay in the creation of “temporary” federal
courts, as proposed by Madison and Wilson
to prevent their total elimination. In turn,
Madison and Wilson wanted to discourage
the participation of state courts in the federal
judiciary, but the two-year delay imposed by
their compromise was essential for letting
this happen.
Consequences, Intended or Not
The “temporary” status of federal
courts later became permanent anyway,
while the postponement in their creation
led to the Judiciary Act, a law that brought
about the absorption of state courts into
a national court system dominated by
the Supreme Court. It turns out that the
imposition of judicial authority from below
established a vertical conduit by which it
could be even more effectively imposed from
above. Martin’s July 17 amendment to grant
independent authority to state justices
bound by state constitutions was later
revised in the supremacy clause to guarantee
the loyalty of these justices to a federal
appeals process. Martin refused to sign the
Constitution based on this issue, but within
a few years became one of the Constitution’s
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most enthusiastic supporters, nicknamed
the “Federal Bulldog” by Jefferson because
of his ardent support once it had been
launched. In all such instances, tactical
victories to postpone if not reject judicial
review helped to set the stage for its later
implementation. Each hostile proposal was
promoted to discourage the enlargement of
the federal judiciary, but in time each led
to exactly the opposite results. And with
good cause. The Constitution would have
been just as ineffective as the Articles of
Confederation in justifying the rejection
of state law incompatible with federal
authority unless the Supreme Court could
be granted the full and necessary powers of
judicial review. In the final analysis these
powers were what mattered, and the maze
of legal contradictions they necessitated was
of subsidiary importance.
As I shall try to demonstrate, there
was in fact a small minority who recognized
the potential benefits of judicial review
sooner than the rest. Such delegates as
James Wilson, William Paterson, and John
Dickinson already had more than ordinary
expertise in colonial law, and four others
had ample experience as judges under the
Articles of Confederation. These included
from Connecticut John Rutledge, Roger
Sherman, William Samuel Johnson, and, not
least, Oliver Ellsworth. Careful examination

43

of Madison’s records of the Convention
suggests that this small nucleus of delegates
fell into adopting a tacit, loosely coordinated
strategy to prepare the grounds for judicial
review at the same time as they prevented
its discussion on the floor of the Convention
as well as possible to prevent its rejection.
This seemingly counter-productive tactic
was used on what might be described as
a conspiratorial basis in order to facilitate
judicial review’s later adoption once the
Constitution had been accepted by state
ratifying conventions.
When the Committee of Detail was
chosen to draft the Constitution based on
resolutions already accepted, three of its five
members, Wilson, Rutledge, and Ellsworth,
belonged to this small nucleus who supported
judicial review, and as a majority these three
probably sought to exclude judicial review
from discussion at the Convention, thereby
preventing its rejection and setting the stage
for its later adoption in order to guarantee
adequate sovereignty.
By late August, Rutledge and
Johnson gained the passage of additional
amendments for this purpose, and Wilson
quickly and perhaps spontaneously tried
to cap their successes by proposing an
amendment overlooked by constitutional
historians that would in fact have installed
judicial review in the Constitution itself. Two

44

years later, in the first session of the U.S.
Senate, Ellsworth led debate in obtaining the
passage of the Judiciary Act, in which a long
and impossibly complicated sentence buried
in Section 25—almost certainly drafted by
Ellsworth himself—that mandated judicial
review more or less as had been intended at
the Convention.
Questionable Coincidences
Was it entirely a coincidence that the
Constitution’s wording in its description of
the judiciary, by most accounts the vaguest
portion in the entire document, was said by
Gouverneur Morris to have been the most
jealously defended by unnamed delegates
who undoubtedly belonged to the group in
question? Or that Madison warned against
judicial review when Johnson and Wilson
proposed their amendments on August 27?
Or that Robert Yates, another Convention
delegate experienced as a judge, wrote a
series of pamphlets after the Convention
in which he vigorously warned against the
threat of the Constitution as a potential
judicial takeover? Or that George Mason,
Edmund Randolph, and Luther Martin,
fellow delegates who actively participated
in Convention proceedings relevant to the
creation of the judiciary, likewise warned of
a judicial takeover at their respective state
ratifying conventions?
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On the other hand it cannot be
overlooked that both Wilson and Ellsworth
vigorously defended judicial review at
their state ratifying conventions, and that
Ellsworth, once having been elected to the
Senate and became its de facto majority
leader, initiated proceedings to put judicial
review into law the very day that the first
Congress convened in 1789. Yet there
has been no systematic effort to trace the
origins of judicial review as the outcome
of a postponement strategy despite the
obvious contradictions that persist in
otherwise trying to explain these origins. As
a result, the most interesting and perhaps
the most important chapter in American
constitutional history has by and large been
overlooked.
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II.
The Origin of Judicial Review
The use of judicial review to impose
the authority of federal courts over both
state and federal law was unknown, even
unthinkable, at the time of the Constitutional
Convention. Judicial review was just
beginning to be recognized as a power of
state courts, but not as a power of federal
courts to overturn both state and federal
laws. The relatively primitive authority of
courts to overturn particular laws in favor
of others was just coming into practice, but
this experience offered little preparation for
the use of judicial review as an instrument of
federal sovereignty. This was an entirely new
application of judicial review, and we should
not be surprised that convention delegates
were unaware of its full potential use.
In fact, the issue of judicial review
had arisen as an issue only a few times in
the decade preceding the Constitutional
Convention, most notably in New Jersey’s
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Holmes v. Walton case decided in 1780.
However, no record of opinion was transcribed
for Holmes v. Walton, and it turns out that
its justices were falsely accused of having
resorted to judicial review (Crosskey, 948;
Berger, 40; and Levy, 93).
The implications of judicial review
were almost as nebulous in other relevant
cases, including Trevett v. Weeden in 1786,
Bayard v. Singleton in 1787, and the Ten
Pounds Case of 1786-87. Moreover, these
precedents applied to the exercise of
judicial review in state courts rather than
an integrated hierarchy of state and federal
courts. The authority of state courts to
resolve contradictions among state laws,
either in or between particular states, was
an entirely different matter from a more
inclusive application of judicial review
involving the power of a federal court to veto
laws based on their accord with a federal
constitution. Without the structure and
hierarchy provided by federal authority, the
full impact of judicial review exercised by
the Supreme Court over state laws could
hardly be anticipated.
English Precedents
Preceding the Revolutionary War,
colonial laws could be appealed to England’s
Privy Council for a final determination, but
there was no clear and binding precedent in

49

English legal history for the veto of laws passed
by Parliament itself. England’s common law
tradition emphasized Parliament’s freedom
to pass laws almost completely without
judicial constraint. And of course there was
no precedent for the veto of laws in conflict
with a written constitution, since no such
constitution existed. English courts had
therefore been limited to a subordinate role
in choosing among laws pertinent to given
cases, and their decisions could be reversed
upon Parliament’s passage of new and more
relevant laws.
Not surprisingly, the problem was
comparable in the former American
colonies after the Revolutionary War.
Of course, state constitutions and the
Articles of Confederation served as written
constitutions, but both state and national
courts continued to play subordinate roles
to their respective legislatures. Congress
appointed Federal courts, and Congress had
full authority to rescind their decisions. As
a result, their assignment was limited to
the adjudication of particular cases without
permanently overturning any laws in favor
of others. The modest independence they
possessed in exercising judicial review
was treated as a vestigial benefit from the
successful effort of the seventeenth century
English jurist, Sir Edward Coke, to emphasize
common law precedents. However, by
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the end of the eighteenth century, Coke’s
limited use of judicial review was considered
archaic, and Blackstone’s bias in favor of
parliamentary authority was accepted as the
appropriate means of fostering democracy
both in Europe and the New World.
American Modifications
In codifying a loose alliance among the
American states, the Articles of Confederation
took this established principle of legislative
dominance to an unprecedented extreme. Our
nation’s sovereignty was almost exclusively
vested in Congress, executive authority was
all but eliminated, and the national judiciary
was reduced to subordinate status as an
appendage of legislative government.
According to Article IX of the Articles
of Confederation, framed in 1778, the
jurisdiction of national courts was restricted
to admiralty disputes, and Congress
appointed these courts for deciding
particular cases. For settling disputes among
the states, Congress appointed temporary
joint courts with judges from all the states
involved. However, like Parliament, Congress
enjoyed the power of final appeal:
The united states in congress
assembled shall also be the last
resort on appeal in all disputes and
differences . . . that . . . arise between
two or more states concerning
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boundary jurisdiction or any other
cause whatsoever” (Commager, 113;
italics added).
This meant that Congress, whenever
it pleased, could revoke decisions of the
temporary federal courts that it had created.
Only with the political ferment of the early
1780s was it discovered that parliamentary
authority alone was insufficient to defend
both property rights and legal precedent
from the pressure politics of angry populist
majorities. As a result, such statesmen as
Washington, Hamilton, and Madison wanted
to resurrect an executive authority that
would be less autocratic than British royalty
but strong enough to offset the vulnerability
of state legislatures to populist factions. To
reinforce this executive authority, they felt it
necessary to impose a federal veto over state
laws and to create a permanent judiciary
able to participate in the veto of federal law.
Judicial review would not be implemented
per se, but Supreme Court justices would
participate along with the President on a
Council of Revision entrusted with rejecting
unconstitutional federal laws. Nowhere was
it suggested that this power might be given
to the courts alone or that it would extend
to the veto of state laws as well.
However, such a veto was desperately
needed. Most of our nation’s political and
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economic difficulties under the Articles of
Confederation resulted from the central
government’s lack of sovereignty over
separate states. Without genuine coercive
power, it was unable to collect fiscal levies,
settle interstate lawsuits, or eliminate trade
wars and unfair interstate tariffs. It could
not establish effective diplomatic relations
with England, nor could it prevent France
and Spain from annexing western lands.
Among the states, it could not stop Rhode
Island from printing and circulating a
worthless paper currency, and it was forced
to resort to military invasion when the Shays’
rebellion erupted in western Massachusetts.
Countless other possibilities could be
imagined of decisions by state legislatures
that would be entirely at odds with federal
authority.
Washington, Hamilton and Madison
felt the only way to eliminate these problems
was to unite the ex-colonies in a stronger
federation than had been established by
the Articles of Confederation—as much
as possible in a single nation. Madison
emphasized this necessity both in his June
26 speech to the Constitutional Convention
and in Number 10 of The Federalist. To
impose centralization, Madison argued,
the first priority was to bring both state
and federal legislative bodies under more
effective control, but the structures he
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proposed excluded judicial review. He
wanted to check Congressional excesses
by combining the executive and judicial
branches in a Council of Revision with
sufficient power to veto unacceptable federal
laws, and he wanted to check the excesses
of state assemblies by giving Congress the
power to veto unacceptable state laws.
Federal legislature would predominate over
state legislatures, and the authority of the
executive branch in combination with the
judicial branch would be imposed as the
ultimate and highest stage in this hierarchy.
Madison accordingly explained in his
correspondence with Jefferson, Washington,
and Edmund Randolph preceding the
Constitutional Convention, he felt the single
most useful, if potentially controversial,
modification in the Constitution would be
to give Congress the authority to veto state
laws in conflict with the laws and treaties
of the federal government (Papers, IX, 318,
368–71, and 382–88). To guarantee federal
sovereignty, he proposed, Congress should
be able to review all laws passed by state
legislatures and to declare null and void
those of them found in conflict with federal
policy. In a speech at the Convention on
June 8, Madison once again emphasized the
absolute necessity of this veto power:
This prerogative of the General Govt.
[the congressional veto of state laws]
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is the great pervading principle
that must controul the centrifugal
tendency of the States; which, without
it, will continually fly out of their
proper orbits and destroy the order
& harmony of the political system (1
Farrand, 165).
Equipped with the power of review,
Congress could impose a consistent
rule of law upon the nation as a whole
without entirely curtailing the autonomy of
particular states. In turn, Congress would
be held responsible to a Council of Revision
composed of the President and chosen
members of the Supreme Court.
Council of Revision
Just as Congress could reverse state
laws, the Council of Revision could reverse
laws passed by Congress. With the help of
this tandem combination of veto powers,
both the rule of law and a modicum of federal
sovereignty could be guaranteed despite
populist control of legislative assemblies at
the state and federal levels. The egalitarian
benefits of legislature could be retained at
both levels, but these would be effectively
offset by giving central government final
authority over state governments and by
establishing at the federal level the power of
veto vested in the President and judiciary.
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These two central features of Madison’s
plan—the congressional veto of state laws
and the veto of federal laws by a Council
of Revision—were respectively incorporated
into Articles 6 and 8 of the Virginia
Plan which Randolph submitted to the
Constitutional Convention as early as May
29, 1787. However, both were decisively
rejected by fellow delegates afraid of a
nationalist takeover at the expense of states
rights. The Council of Revision was defeated
by significant margins on June 4, June 6,
July 21, and August 15. On the other hand
congressional review was unanimously
accepted on May 31, but on June 8 it was
reconsidered and heavily defeated, with only
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts
voting in the affirmative. Twice again, on
July 17 and August 23, it was introduced
for reconsideration, but in both instances
it was defeated by comparable margins.
The very delegates assembled to establish
a stronger national government thus
decisively repudiated the core of Madison’s
plan. However, Madison himself remained
convinced that effective centralization was
impossible without imposing adequate
constraints upon state and federal
legislatures, and that this was only possible
by imposing congressional review.
New Strategy
With the defeat of Madison’s strategy,
an entirely different strategy emerged at the
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Convention whereby judicial review might
later be implemented to substitute for
congressional review. This entailed granting
the Supreme Court the power to review and
veto (or “negative”) both state and federal
laws, thus vesting in the Supreme Court
alone the authority of both Congress and
the Council of Revision as described by the
Virginia Plan. In the case of state laws, state
supreme courts would first exercise judicial
review at their level of authority, and then,
for whatever laws accepted by these courts
as being constitutional, an appeal could
be made for a final determination by the
federal Supreme Court. Though such an
arrangement might seem more attenuated,
its advantages would include a significant
reduction in the number of state laws
submitted to review at the federal level and
an improved balance between state and
federal sovereignties. State laws could only
be appealed to the Supreme Court after their
acceptance by state courts, so state as well
as federal judiciaries would play a role in
their rejection.
However, as earlier indicated, this
use judicial review to help defend national
sovereignty was unknown at the time. There
were no available European precedents,
and convention delegates who sought to
impose judicial review only gradually came
to recognize their objectives and how they
might be implemented. They also recognized
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that if judicial review were submitted to a vote
at the Convention, it was just as likely to be
defeated as Madison’s plan for congressional
review. Even if judicial review were accepted
and incorporated into the Constitution, its
threat to states rights would probably have
led to the rejection of the Constitution at state
ratifying conventions the following year. As
earlier indicated, it is my thesis that these
delegates therefore strove to exclude judicial
review from debate, postponing its adoption
until Congress established inferior federal
courts subsequent to the ratification at state
conventions as specified by Article III. Once
these inferior courts were installed, judicial
review could be imposed in transition from
state to federal courts.
At first these delegates resorted
to a strategy of omission, leaving gaps
in the description of the judiciary to
be filled at a later time, but toward
the end of the Convention they added
seemingly inconsequential wording whose
interpretation both encouraged and justified
the inclusion of judicial review once the time
came to establish these intermediate courts.
Especially important was the amendment
Wilson proposed on August 27 that would
have fully incorporated judicial review
into the Constitution itself. After Wilson
withdrew his amendment, John Dickinson
proposed a substitute amendment with
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portions of Wilson’s wording that was in fact
used to justify the establishment of judicial
review by Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary
Act. On August 27, it seems, Wilson briefly
considered adding judicial review to the
Constitution, but then chose to continue the
original postponement strategy, setting the
stage for the Judiciary Act two years later.
Federal Authority
Once the Constitution was accepted
by state ratification conventions, the 1789
Judiciary Act was enacted, giving the
Supreme Court its “vertical” authority over
state laws by permitting state court decisions
to be appealed to the federal Supreme Court
for a final dispensation. As a concession
to anti-nationalists, state judiciaries were
given exclusive original jurisdiction: only
those laws which state courts reviewed and
accepted as being constitutional could be
appealed to the federal Supreme Court. On
the other hand, if one or more state courts
rejected a law as being unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court could not reexamine
it towards its ratification at a higher
level. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
was granted final jurisdiction at least in
determining the constitutionality of state
laws, and this alone, it turns out, provided
adequate defense of federal sovereignty, if
with less authority than what Madison had
sought by means of congressional review.
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Sixteen years later, Chief Justice
Marshall’s famous 1803 Marbury v. Madison
decision extended this “vertical” power to
the Supreme Court’s “horizontal” ability to
veto federal laws passed by Congress. The
presidential veto could be exercised during
the passage of a law, but only the Supreme
Court could review and overturn a law once
the President had signed it. This final power
of review granted to the Supreme Court was
already implicit in both the “arising under”
clause of Article III in the Constitution and
the first clause in Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act, but it was Marshall’s decision that set
the stage for its acceptance as official federal
policy.
As earlier indicated, the concept of
judicial review in determining whether laws
accord with a written constitution was just
beginning to be understood by the time of
the Convention. Nowhere else in Europe or
the United States had judicial review been
used to impose national authority at the
expense of state and local governance. As to
be expected, the possibility of substituting
judicial review for congressional review in
order to guarantee federal sovereignty was
almost inconceivable to most delegates at the
Convention. At first the steps taken toward
the later imposition of judicial review seem
to have been unintended, certainly by the
majority of Convention delegates. However,
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a small minority of delegates fell into a
cooperative strategy toward this end, and
their effort may be described as having been
at least partly deliberate, as much a matter
of shared serendipity—call it an accidental
conspiracy.
These delegates apparently foresaw the
benefits of judicial review earlier than others
and possessed the tactical flexibility to make
the necessary moves toward its potential
implementation at a later date. They cannot
be said to have brought into play an intricate
strategy they fully understood from the
beginning, but there is ample evidence that
they strove to keep possibilities open once
judicial review seemed needed.
On August 13, Dickinson of Delaware,
who played a cooperative role in setting the
stage for judicial review, recommended the
pragmatic value of makeshift innovations
based on experience:
Experience must be our only guide.
Reason may mislead us. It was not
reason that discovered the singular &
admirable mechanism of the English
Constitution. It was not reason
that discovered or ever could have
discovered the odd & in the eye of
those who are governed by reason,
the absurd mode of trial by Jury.
Accidents probably produced these
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discoveries, and experience has give
[sic] a sanction to them. This is then
our guide (2 Farrand, 278).
True to Dickinson’s perception, the
proponents of judicial review took advantage
of accidents, leading to discoveries and
further accidents yet. Pragmatism was their
modus operandi, not theoretical consistency.
Much was at stake, and their success is best
judged by today’s integration of state and
federal government as reinforced by the
authority of our nation’s courts.
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III.
The Principal Architects
of Judicial Review
If a strategy to postpone and thus
improve the chances of implementing judicial
review emerged during the Convention, it was
either ignored or opposed by the founders
usually credited with having forged the
Constitution. Such figures as Washington
and Franklin did not address themselves to
the issue of judicial review beyond Franklin’s
criticism of the committee of revision:
. . . it would be improper to put it in the
hands of any Man to negative a Law
passed by the Legislature because it
would give him the controul of the
legislature (1 Farrand, 109).
His comment was probably intended to
apply to judges as well as members of the
executive branch.
Hamilton’s input at the Convention
was mostly counterproductive. Portions
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of his wording to describe the judiciary in
his abortive Hamilton Plan seem to have
been incorporated into the first draft of
the Constitution, but his recommendation
that the power of review over state laws be
exercised by state governors was totally
disregarded by fellow delegates. Hamilton
was discouraged by the hostile reception to
his June 18 speech and by his unavailing
minority status in the New York delegation.
He therefore departed from Philadelphia on
June 29 and stayed away, except for brief
visits, until early September, when the
success of the Constitutional Convention
was virtually guaranteed. As a result, he
was absent when the wording of Articles III
and VI was debated on the powers of the
judiciary.
Hamilton’s principal contribution
came later, when he belatedly added
six insightful chapters upon the federal
judiciary (Numbers 78 to 83) to the 1788
bound edition of The Federalist. These were
valuable in anticipating the Judiciary Act,
but his arguments should not be treated as
having been guidelines which were followed
in drafting it, since the essential purpose of
judicial review was already familiar to the
Convention delegates who were responsible
for relevant portions in the Constitution and
who would later play a role in framing the
1789 Judiciary Act.
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As the principal architect of the
Constitution, Madison was ambivalent about
judicial review and more often than not
opposed to it. Throughout the Convention
and most of his subsequent career, he
harbored serious doubts about judicial
authority—doubts that can possibly be
traced to his Princeton education in theology
rather than the law, as compared to the
legal training of such Princeton classmates
as Ellsworth, Paterson, Martin, and Burr.
At the Convention, Madison sought
to create an effective but circumscribed
judiciary by restricting the veto of Supreme
Court justices to their participation on the
Council of Revision. As he explained in a
letter to James Monroe in 1817, thirty years
later, he had advocated this plan at the
Convention at least partly to avoid giving the
Supreme Court an exclusive and final power
to review federal laws (3 Farrand, 424).
Ironically, he wanted to curtail the power
of the judiciary by limiting it to a role on
the Council of Revision, while Luther Martin
and others wanted to guarantee this result
even further by keeping it off the Council
of Revision. Their goals were similar—a
strong but constrained judiciary—but their
strategies were entirely different.
On June 20, 1787, at an early stage
in Convention proceedings, Jefferson had
written Madison from France, explaining
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that judicial review would be more
selective, and therefore more practical, than
congressional review as a check upon state
laws (Papers, X, 64). Jefferson did not clarify
whether he felt that state or federal courts
should be used, and there is no evidence
that Madison discussed Jefferson’s proposal
with those who supported judicial review at
the Convention.
On July 23, Madison seems to have
conceded the inevitability of judicial review
(“A law violating a constitution established by
the people themselves, would be considered
by the Judges as null & void”), but on August
27 he expressed his doubts, and twice
again, on August 28 and September 12, he
reaffirmed his preference for congressional
review over judicial review. On the latter
occasion, for example, he argued that state
tariffs might be controlled by the federal
government through the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as “the source of redress.”
Nevertheless, he warned that in his own
opinion, “. . . this was insufficient. A
[congressional] negative on the State laws
alone could meet all the shapes which
these could assume” (2 Farrand, 589; also
93 and 430). Madison wanted to create
effective federal courts without the power of
judicial review, and he remained critical of
judicial review during the Convention and
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throughout his later career (3 Farrand, 136,
516, 523, 527).
Supporting Delegates
Less eminent were the half dozen
delegates who may be identified as having
actively sought to implement judicial
review during the two years spanning the
Constitutional Convention, the 1788 state
ratifying conventions, and the First Congress
of 1789. As already indicated, these included
Wilson of Pennsylvania, Rutledge of South
Carolina, Paterson of New Jersey, and
Sherman, William Johnson and Ellsworth
of Connecticut. All but Wilson and Rutledge
belonged to the original leadership of the
small-state coalition, and Rutledge helped
to bring the small southern states into
this coalition by early June. For business
reasons, Paterson left the Convention on
June 29, and Ellsworth on August 24, but
their support was firm and they would later
work to impose judicial review in the 1789
Congress.
James Wilson began as a close ally of
Madison and later played an effective role
in the federalist coalition that combined
the small-state leadership with most of the
leadership of Madison’s original coalition.
Wilson was widely respected for both
his legal education in Scotland and his
expertise in the law, reputed to be best in
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America. His importance at the Convention
was also enhanced by his friendly relations
with Rutledge, one of the southern-state
leadership, and by his personal friendship
with Robert Morris, reputed to be the
principal financier of the Revolutionary War.
Through Morris, who hosted Washington
during the Convention, Wilson could work
in a productive relationship with Madison
and others of the Virginia delegation.
John Rutledge, a hero of the
Revolutionary War and the former governor
of South Carolina, played an important role
as a southern delegate in Madison’s coalition
who was able to balance his regional
allegiance with his recognition of South
Carolina’s shared interests with northern
small states. Preceding the Convention,
Rutledge engaged in business relations with
Wilson, and for the first few weeks of the
Convention he resided at Wilson’s house in
Philadelphia. This association, combined
with his tactical alliance with the Connecticut
and New Jersey delegations, undoubtedly
helped to bridge the gap between the large
and small state interests in the final stages
of the Convention.
William Paterson had served as New
Jersey’s Attorney General when judicial
review was first brought to public attention
in the 1780 Holmes v. Walton case decided
in New Jersey. He was also on friendly
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terms with Ellsworth since their association
in a Princeton debating club (Brown, 20).
His jocular letter to Ellsworth during the
Convention could only have been written by
an old friend (4 Farrand, 73).
A Northern Team
Connecticut’s three delegates, Roger
Sherman, William Samuel Johnson, and
Oliver Ellsworth, consistently worked as a
team during the Convention. Sherman and
Ellsworth were close friends, and all three had
served on the Connecticut Supreme Court.
Their effective cooperation with each other
in convention deliberations was perhaps the
most obvious in their campaign to impose the
Connecticut Compromise between large and
small states by letting Senators be elected
by state legislatures and Representatives
by popular ballot, an arrangement nullified
in 1912 by the Seventeenth Amendment.
Until this amendment large states would
necessarily dominate the House of
Representatives because of their greater
population, but small states would no less
effectively dominate the Senate because of
equal representation among states, and with
the additional benefit that Senators would
be chosen by states’ political leadership as
opposed to the less predictable will of the
populace at large.
To seal this compromise, Connecticut’s
delegates were obliged to obtain the support
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of southern states by accepting the ownership
of slaves as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Ellsworth himself gave two pivotal speeches
at the Convention supportive of slavery,
taking advantage of his status as a northern
delegate without slaves of his own. His last
act on the floor of the Convention, mentioned
without comment by Madison the day before
his departure from the convention, was his
second speech emphasizing what amounted
to the tactical importance of supporting
slavery.
Again, a trade-off was obviously
involved: in exchange for the support
of slavery by the small northern states,
the southern states would support the
Connecticut Compromise, thereby providing
a sufficient majority to permit a continuation
of deliberations at the Convention. No slavery
meant no legislative compromise, and its
rejection meant renewed failure in the effort
to impose a viable Constitution. Without
these linked compromises—the acceptance of
slavery by small northern states in exchange
for the bicameral legislature specifically
advocated by Ellsworth—the entire purpose
of the Convention would probably have been
thwarted much as had already happened
with the Articles of Confederation.
The primary goal, of course, was a
strong central government. At first the
three Connecticut delegates resisted
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modifications that would strengthen it,
but they reversed themselves once the
Connecticut Compromise gave small states
the share of power they demanded in the
federal government. Sherman had more
or less taken the lead when they opposed
a strong judiciary, but Ellsworth emerged
with a leadership role of his own when
they changed their minds and supported
it. Sherman declared as late as August 15
that he disapproved of judges “meddling
in politics and parties,” but Ellsworth had
much earlier advocated strengthening the
judiciary, for example declaring on July 21
his full support of the Council of Revision
promoted by Madison:
The aid of the Judges will give more
wisdom & firmness to the Executive.
They will possess a systematic and
accurate knowledge of the Laws,
which the Executive cannot be
expected always to possess. Of this
the Judges alone will have competent
information (2 Farrand, 73).
Few others during the Convention expressed
such unqualified confidence in the role of
the judiciary in federal government.
As the senior member of the Connecticut
delegation, Sherman was conspicuous in
debate and addressed most of the issues
on which the Connecticut delegation were
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in full agreement. Johnson rarely took the
floor, but he enjoyed the singular status
of having received an honorary Ph.D. in
law from Oxford. He may also be credited
with having proposed the key amendment
that set the stage for the Supreme Court’s
judicial review of both state and federal law.
It was Ellsworth, however, who turns out to
have played a pivotal role—perhaps the most
important of all—in having participated on
the Committee of Detail that first drafted
the Constitution and in having later taken
the lead in drafting and forcing the passage
of the 1789 Judiciary Act. Like Sherman,
Ellsworth had served on the Continental
Congress’s Court (or Committee) of Appeals,
the predecessor of the Supreme Court under
the Articles of Confederation. During his
service with this Committee, Ellsworth was
able to observe at first hand its failure to
resolve the celebrated Olmstead Case (in
which Wilson served as counsel for General
Benedict Arnold), thus exposing the central
government’s inadequate sovereignty over
state governments.
At the Convention, Ellsworth played a
subordinate role to Sherman and remained
silent in floor debate until his proposal was
unanimously accepted on June 20 to remove
the word national from the Constitution. Its
connotations of central authority offended
small state delegates, so the problem
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could be resolved, Ellsworth suggested, by
identifying the political entity to be created
as “the United States.”
The legal name of their new nation at its
inception would be its generic designation—
just as Istanbul, once the capitol city of the
Ottoman Empire, designates nothing more
than “the City” as described by Turkish
language. Apropos of the United States, what
might have seemed a blank title equivalent to
“combined body politic” nevertheless implied
national unity with Gouverneur Morris’s
addition of two THE’s in the Preamble to
the final draft of the Constitution: WE, THE
PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. With
the inclusion of these articles in capital
letters, the nation’s description first used by
Paine and later in both the Declaration of
Independence and Articles of Confederation
confirmed the achievement of unification,
thus giving the new coalition of states what
seemed its appropriate name linked with
its historic origins. The vote on the floor
supportive of this proposal was unanimous,
and the rest of the world had little difficulty
in accepting the name.
Experience Counts
Soon enough Ellsworth was in the
thick of debate leading to the Connecticut
Compromise, his particular version having
finally been adopted, and toward the end
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of July he was elected to the Committee of
Detail that authored the first draft of the
Constitution.
In the first two months of the
Convention, all except Wilson among these
delegates supportive of judicial review
belonged to the small-state faction opposed
to a strong national government, but once
the Connecticut Compromise was accepted
they too became ardent nationalists. George
Bancroft later suggested the impact of their
shift favorable to the Constitution’s eventual
passage:
From the day when every doubt of
the right of the smaller states to an
equal vote in the senate was quieted,
they so I receive it from the lips of
Madison, and so it appears from the
records exceeded all others in zeal
for granting powers to the general
government. Ellsworth became one
of its strongest pillars. Paterson of
New Jersey was for the rest of his life
a federalist of federalists (4 Farrand,
89).
The benefits of this realignment were
plain by early August, when these delegates
(excluding Paterson, who had already left the
Convention) joined in an expanded coalition
with delegates from the large-state faction
who accepted the Connecticut Compromise.
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Many of the original leadership in Madison’s
coalition were lawyers in their mid-thirties
(or younger, as in Charles Pinckney’s case)
who were eloquent but relatively impatient
of detail. Averaging at least a decade older
(Sherman was sixty-six years old, Johnson
sixty, Dickinson fifty-five, Rutledge fortyeight, and Ellsworth and Paterson fortytwo), these small-state spokesmen were
less interested in expounding their views
at length than in obtaining their objectives
as guaranteed by the precise wording of the
Constitution.
The status and experience of Rutledge
and the three Connecticut delegates as state
supreme-court justices also put them in a
special elite at the Convention. Over half
the fifty-five delegates had legal experience,
but not more than eight had served as
court justices, four of whom belonged to
this nucleus. Significantly, another state
justice at the Convention—Robert Yates of
New York—later wrote pamphlets attacking
the Constitution because he suspected it
would eventually give too much power to
the judiciary. With his background on the
bench, he fully understood the importance
of judicial review as a source of federal
power, and apparently he was aware that it
might be brought into play, thereby filling
the obvious gap in the Constitution as
presented to the state ratifying conventions.
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The only difference was that he opposed its
implementation.
As the Convention advanced, these
five delegates both with judicial experience
and fully supportive of judicial review—
Rutledge, Paterson, Sherman, Ellsworth,
and Johnson—seem to have fallen into a
loose confederation with Wilson (forty-five
years old), who was a highly successful
lawyer if without judicial experience on
the bench. They apparently worked in
combinations of two, three, and even four
to set the stage for the eventual acceptance
of judicial review. As earlier indicated, all
were legal experts—four of them (Rutledge
and the three Connecticut delegates) with
experience as justices of state supreme
courts, two (Sherman and Ellsworth) with
additional experience on the Continental
Congress’s Court (or Committee) of Appeals.
The success of their combined
effort benefitted from the participation of
Wilson, Rutledge, and Ellsworth on the
Committee of Detail which first drafted the
Constitution, also by the close teamwork
among the Connecticut delegation, by the
tactical alliance between Rutledge and the
Connecticut delegation in bridging southern
and northern small-state interests, and by
the personal friendships between Rutledge
and Wilson and between Ellsworth and both
Sherman and Paterson.
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The participation of other delegates
at the Convention seems to have been
peripheral. Dickinson (the principal author
of the Articles of Confederation) and Luther
Martin of Maryland proposed amendments
helpful to judicial review, respectively the
“law and fact” and “supremacy” clauses,
but neither of them seems to have been
in the thick of the effort to impose judicial
review. It can be speculated that Dickinson
belatedly came to support the plan during
the Convention, whereas Martin’s angry
departure in August probably resulted in
large part from his unwillingness to accept
this use of judicial authority as he himself
implied by his own amendment.
The role of others is less definable.
Hamilton and William Davie of North
Carolina openly advocated judicial review
without applying any obvious effort toward
its implementation, and many others made
remarks at one point or another that may
be construed as having expressed their
support (Berger, 47119). However, none
of them seems to have contributed to the
preparations for judicial review’s acceptance
at a later time.
Obviously, certain steps needed to be
taken to lay the groundwork for judicial
review, for example in the Constitution’s
wording relevant to the creation of
the judiciary, and careful scrutiny of
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Convention records discloses the relatively
close cooperation among Wilson, Rutledge,
Paterson, Sherman, Ellsworth, and
Johnson in crafting these passages. Early
in debate, for example, Rutledge, seconded
by Sherman, proposed an amendment to
replace permanent federal appeals courts
with state courts. At the time their purpose
seemed to curtail the power of the central
government, but the use of state courts
as federal appeals courts later turned out
to be essential preliminary to granting the
Supreme Court the power of judicial review
over state law.
All but Wilson and Rutledge probably
helped to draft the New Jersey Plan, portions
of which would have given the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over state law,
and it was Paterson who presented this plan
to the Convention as a whole. As members of
the Committee of Detail, Wilson, Rutledge,
and Ellsworth participated in writing an
initial draft of the Constitution whose
wording emphasized giving Congress the
needed latitude to bring state courts into
the federal judiciary once the Constitution
was ratified. Twice Wilson praised judicial
and/or congressional review on the floor of
the Convention, but only to be silenced by
Rutledge and Ellsworth, apparently to keep
the issue off the agenda.
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Balance Aborning
Rutledge and Johnson then proposed
the two amendments whose wording
established the groundwork for the later
adoption of judicial review. Wilson followed by
proposing his amendment which, combined
with theirs, would have brought judicial
review into the Constitution by giving the
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
state law. As already indicated, he abruptly
withdrew it before it could be submitted to
a vote. However, Dickinson resubmitted the
“law and fact” portion of Wilson’s amendment
for a vote, and its passage helped to justify
the later imposition of judicial review in the
1789 Judiciary Act.
Johnson and Wilson were probably
among the delegates mentioned by
Gouverneur Morris as having fought to
protect the exact wording upon the judiciary
from stylistic revision in the final draft of
the Constitution. It may be speculated that
they wanted to avoid apparently harmless
but substantive changes that might have
justified preventing the adoption of judicial
review at a later time. After the Convention,
Wilson and Ellsworth went public at their
respective state ratifying conventions by
emphasizing the importance of judicial
review. Finally, in the 1789 Senate, Ellsworth
and Paterson played central roles in drafting
a Judiciary Act to permit the judicial review
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of state law, and Ellsworth took the lead in
forcing the passage of this Act.
Perhaps coincidentally, four of these
delegates—Wilson, Rutledge, Paterson, and
Ellsworth—later served on the Supreme
Court, Ellsworth as Chief Justice from
1796 to 1800. In 1847, a half century
later, John Calhoun singled out Ellsworth,
Sherman, and Paterson for having created
an effective system of federal government in
which centralization and the sovereignty of
individual states were effectively balanced:
It is owing mainly to the states of
Connecticut and New Jersey that we
have a federal instead of a national
government the best government
instead of the worst and most
intolerable on the earth. Who are
the men of these states to whom we
are indebted for this excellent form
of government? I will name them.
Their names ought to be written on
brass, and live forever. They were
Chief Justice Ellsworth and Roger
Sherman of Connecticut, and Judge
Paterson of New Jersey. The other
states further south were blind;
they did not see the future. But to
the coolness and sagacity of these
three men, aided by others not so
prominent, do we owe our present
constitution (Brown, 165).
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If Calhoun specifically limited his
praise to these three delegates for having
strengthened the judiciary to guarantee
a federalist balance between state and
national sovereignties, as would seem to be
the case, he neglected the important roles
played by Rutledge, Wilson, and Johnson.
Unfortunately, none of these six delegates
documented their activities, and they lacked
the celebrity status later conferred on such
figures as Washington, Franklin, Madison,
and Hamilton. As a result, their loosely
coordinated effort to introduce judicial
review has been almost totally overlooked
in constitutional history.
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IV.
Convention Debate on
Judicial Authority
An independent judiciary with the
power to check both state and federal laws
was hardly attractive to most of the delegates
when they arrived to participate at the
Constitutional Convention. Such delegates
as Elbridge Gerry and Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts, George Mason of Virginia,
and Luther Martin of Maryland recognized
the necessity of defining judicial authority
in the Constitution, but their purpose was
to minimize its role, and they assumed the
need to isolate state and national courts as
much as possible.
Moreover, they were apprehensive of
full-scale nationalism, and the possibility
that it might be obtained by unleashing
federal courts as the final arbiters of state
law would have been considered no more
acceptable than the power of veto earlier
granted to the Privy Council over colonial
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law. When Gerry declared on June 4 the
shocking information that a few state courts
“had actually set aside laws as being agst the
[state] Constitution [italics added],” the tone
of disbelief in his use of the word actually
conveyed the unfamiliarity of most delegates
with the possibility of using judicial review to
challenge the authority of legislature under
constitutional government (1 Farrand, 97).
Delegates were willing to accept the
role of state judges in expounding laws and
giving preference to some at the expense
of others as originally advocated by Coke.
However, they did not associate this capacity
with the veto of laws in conflict with a state
or federal constitution, or, one step further,
with the Supreme Court’s veto of state laws
in conflict with the federal Constitution.
Probably in response to Gerry’s earlier
remark, Wilson once again suggested the
viability of judicial review on July 21:
It had been said that the Judges, as
expositors of the Laws would have
an opportunity of defending their
constitutional rights. There was
weight in this observation; but this
power of the Judges did not go far
enough (2 Farrand, 73).
Opposed to this view, Martin warned
later in the day that the Supreme Court’s
power to interpret the law, coupled with its
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participation on the Council of Revision,
would produce a “double negative” giving it
too much control of federal laws (2 Farrand,
76). Here the delayed exchange between
Wilson and Martin might seem to have
implied the common acceptance of judicial
review as a veto of laws passed by Congress.
Not surprisingly, George Mason
challenged Martin’s exaggeration of the
judicial “exposition” of laws to the status
of a veto. Mason’s argument has been
misconstrued to suggest that he shared
Martin’s assumptions (e.g., Berger 58, 161,
341), but this is simply not true. For a
clarification of Mason’s intended meaning,
his words may be quoted with bracketed
additions:
It has been said (by Mr. L. Martin)
that if the judges were joined in this
check on the laws [by the Council of
Revision], they would have a double
negative, since in their expository
capacity of judges they would [already]
have one negative. He [Mason] would
reply that in this [double] capacity
they could impede in one case [as
judges] only the operation of the laws.
[On the other hand, as members of
the Council of Revision], they could
declare an unconstitutional law void.
But with regard to every law however
unjust oppressive or pernicious,
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which did not plainly come under
this description [i.e., as having been
submitted to judgment by the Council
of Revision], they would be under the
necessity as Judges to give it a free
course [i.e., to abide by it] (2 Farrand,
78).
The meaning of this passage transcribed by
Madison as clarified by italicized portions
was probably intended by Mason, but his
intentions were obscured by awkward
elisions either by Mason himself in
explaining his ideas or by Madison in trying
to copy his remarks while he was speaking.
Nevertheless, Mason entirely supported the
Council of Revision, so his words cannot
be interpreted to challenge its usefulness
because of the excessive power it would
grant the judiciary. In effect, Gerry had
mentioned rumors of judicial review, Wilson
had confirmed them, and Martin had argued
that such a possibility would give judges a
“double negative” if they also served on the
Council of Revision.
In contrast, Mason was a member of
the Virginia delegation who unanimously
supported the Council of Revision, arguably
one of the most important features of
the Virginia Plan. He may accordingly
be assumed to have responded with the
argument, apparently true at the time, that
the ability of judges to expound the laws
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from the bench should not be confused with
the even greater power of particular judges
when serving on the Council of Revision to
declare these laws null and void. Only as
members of the Council of Revision would
they exercise this full power of veto. It is
important to recognize here that Mason was
defending judicial authority relevant to the
Council of Revision, not to what would later
be advocated as judicial review, which he
vigorously attacked after the Convention. In
fact, he probably shared Madison’s strategy
to limit judicial participation in the review
process to the Council of Revision in order
to prevent its more effective application
through judicial review.
As earlier indicated, Madison’s plan
to curtail legislative excesses at the state
level by imposing congressional review
and establishing a Council of Revision
was rejected by the Convention by midJuly. The President’s veto of federal law
remained the single counter-majoritarian
“negative” accepted by the Convention, but
it was irrelevant to the question of federal
sovereignty over state laws. States could
continue to pass whatever laws they pleased,
and these laws would remain on the books
despite their potential conflict with federal
laws, federal treaties, and the Constitution
of the United States.
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Why had Madison’s plan failed? Because
at this stage in Convention proceedings
large-state anti-nationalists such as Gerry of
Massachusetts and Robert Yates and John
Lansing of New York had fallen into a working
coalition with small-state delegates opposed
to a large-state takeover. Together, they
were able to block every effort to establish
a strong central government based on the
enlargement of the powers of the executive
and judicial branches. If the substitution
of judicial for congressional review escaped
their condemnation, it was only because
it could be overlooked resulting from its
novelty. Judicial review was missing from the
Virginia Plan and could be bypassed in floor
debate as a new and untested innovation.
Politics of Jurisdiction
At the beginning most small-state
delegates wanted to give original federal
jurisdiction to state courts in order to help
curtail federal authority. They sought an
appeals system from state to federal courts
specifically based on fact, not law, and they
wanted not to expand federal jurisdiction,
but to guarantee the primary role of state
courts in the federal judiciary. Rutledge,
Paterson, Sherman, Ellsworth, and Johnson
possessed sufficient legal backgrounds to
grasp the implications of judicial review as
a more inclusive principle, which might be
incorporated into such an appeals system,
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but as long as they opposed centralization,
they could hardly be expected to promote
judicial review as an instrument for bringing
it about.
Only when the July 16 Connecticut
Compromise united large and small states in
a new and more inclusive coalition, did these
delegates join in seeking a strong central
government. At this point, however, they
would necessarily have found themselves
between the horns of a dilemma if they wanted
to impose judicial review. The Convention
was probably the most sympathetic body
of American leaders that could be gathered
for accepting such a new and innovative
principle. But if judicial review were debated
by the Convention and voted down, as it
probably would have been, its later adoption
would have been difficult, if not impossible.
This was already the fate of congressional
review, and prospects would have been the
same for judicial review. Once defeated, its
later resurrection as an amendment to the
Constitution would have required a twothirds majority in Congress, or, even more
difficult, three-quarters support from state
legislatures. On the other hand, if judicial
review were accepted by the Convention
and incorporated into the Constitution, its
inclusion would probably have led to the
Constitution’s rejection at state ratifying
conventions. Judicial review therefore
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needed to be postponed as an issue. It was
best kept from debate and set aside until
the Constitution was ratified, after which it
could be discretely implemented by a simple
majority of Congress.
Beneficial to this effort was the
opposition to an enlargement in federal
courts early in the Convention by the very
small-state delegates who would later be
seeking to implement judicial review. As early
as June 5, six weeks before the Connecticut
Compromise, Rutledge proposed a motion,
seconded by Sherman, to eliminate the
creation of permanent inferior federal
courts. Rutledge argued that the original
jurisdiction of federal cases could be given
to state courts, and then, if necessary, these
cases could be appealed to the Supreme
Court for a final determination (1 Farrand,
124). Here Rutledge advocated the use of
state courts to curtail federal authority. He
was willing to concede the Supreme Court’s
review of specific cases, not its review of
laws by which these cases might be judged.
As a small-state delegate, he wanted at
this stage in the Convention to diminish
federal authority relative to state authority,
so he sought to give state courts original
jurisdiction in the federal judiciary.
In debate Rutledge fully acknowledged
his intentions, but to maximize support
for his amendment he worded it to reject
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permanent inferior federal courts without
specifying the use of state courts as the
obvious alternative in serving this purpose.
Delegates from Connecticut and New Jersey
teamed up with those from Georgia and
North and South Carolina in support of
Rutledge’s amendment, winning a narrow
5 to 4 victory over delegates from Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Delaware
(Dickinson included). Votes were divided,
therefore discounted, in the Massachusetts
and New York delegations, probably because
Gerry of Massachusetts and Yates and
Lansing of New York sided with Rutledge.
Inferior Courts
In a quick tactical maneuver, Madison
and Wilson responded by proposing a
compromise amendment, later described
as the “Madison compromise,” which let
Congress establish temporary inferior courts
as soon as it convened subsequent to the
ratification of the Constitution (1 Farrand,
125). As earlier indicated, Madison wanted
a strong federal judiciary without the power
of judicial review, and at this stage in
debate Wilson shared Madison’s objective.
The two of them based their proposal on
Dickinson’s argument just before Rutledge’s
motion came to vote, that Congress should
be given the authority to create the national
judiciary—once again a small-state proposal
probably intended to maximize the role of
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state courts. Madison and Wilson could
anticipate support among convention
delegates for such a compromise, since the
Articles of Confederation already provided
the appointment of temporary federal courts.
Only the Connecticut and South Carolina
delegations voted against their amendment,
while New York’s vote continued to be
divided.
As it later turned out, the postponement
in the creation of “temporary” federal courts
expanded to become a postponement in the
creation of the entire appeals system. In
effect, the choice to arrive at a permanent
integration of state and federal courts was
held over until after the ratification of the
Constitution, and, needless to say, this was
highly useful to the cause.
On July 18, the issue of the status
of inferior courts was introduced a second
time. Three small-state delegates—
Sherman, Martin, and Pierce Butler of
South Carolina—renewed their effort to
grant state courts original jurisdiction,
while three large state delegates—Nathaniel
Gorham of Massachusetts and Randolph
and Mason of Virginia—opposed them,
respectively because of precedent, because
of the unreliability of state courts, and
because of future uncertainty in the role
of the courts (2 Farrand, 46). This time the
power of Congress to create inferior courts
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was confirmed by a unanimous vote, but
as before without specifying whether these
inferior courts would include state courts
as well as federal appeals courts. This was
an important choice, but it was excluded
from the wording and thus postponed until
Congress could establish these inferior
courts, as it turned out, two years later with
the 1789 Judiciary Act.
In retrospect, it seems clear that the
Madison compromise came of desperation,
not conspiracy, and that its success led to
results entirely different from what anybody
had anticipated. Once Congress was granted
the power to create temporary federal courts,
the possibility was salvaged of maintaining a
strong federal court system, but as was later
recognized—perhaps as early as mid-July—
what turned out to be a two-year delay in the
creation of this system opened an important
loophole for additional modifications once the
Constitution had been ratified. By limiting
the Constitution’s description of the federal
judiciary to the Supreme Court alone, the
Convention postponed the establishment of
the rest of the federal judiciary, including
Rutledge’s proposal for giving state courts at
least a portion of original jurisdiction. Also
permitted was the Supreme Court’s judicial
review of state law as an afterthought that
completed the package.
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Madison’s compromise victory for
federal courts thus paved the way for exactly
what he wanted to avoid: both the inclusion
of state courts in the federal judiciary and
the imposition of judicial review.
New Jersey Plan
On June 15, ten days after Rutledge’s
amendment, Paterson had presented the
New Jersey Plan to the Convention as a
substitute for the Virginia Plan that would be
acceptable to small-state and anti-nationalist
delegates. The New Jersey Plan featured a
couple of important proposals bearing upon
the judiciary, which were eventually brought
into constitutional law. Proposition 5 defined
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, and Proposition 6, like Resolution 14
of the Virginia Plan, established an oath to
guarantee the loyalty of state justices to the
federal government. But most important,
Proposition 2 formalized Rutledge’s earlier
suggestion by giving state courts original
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction strictly limited to foreign and
interstate legal disputes:
. . . all punishments, fines, forfeitures
& penalties to be incurred for
contravening such acts rules and
regulations shall be adjudged by the
Common law Judiciaries of the State
in which . . . [these offenses] . . . have
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been committed or perpetrated, with
liberty of commencing in the first
instance all suits & prosecutions for
that purpose in the superior common
law Judiciary in such State, subject
nevertheless, for the correction of all
errors, both in law & fact in rendering
judgment, to an appeal to the
Judiciary of the U. States (Madison,
119).
Here the hierarchy needed for the Supreme
Court’s power of judicial review over state
law was suggested without mentioning the
power of judicial review itself. Verdicts could
be appealed, but not necessarily laws based
on their constitutional validity.
Those besides Paterson who participated
in drafting the New Jersey Plan probably
included Martin, Dickinson, and Lansing of
New York as well as the three Connecticut
delegates (1 Farrand, 242). Martin’s share
in the authorship of Propositions 2, 5, and
6 has been speculated, and contributions
from others were also highly probable
(Clarkson and Jett, 92). On June 19 the
New Jersey Plan was decisively rejected by
the Convention as a whole after a passionate
denunciation by Madison that swayed even
the Connecticut delegation to switch its vote.
On July 17, almost a month later (and
one day after the Connecticut Compromise),
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Martin took advantage of momentum
favorable to small-state interests and
reintroduced a portion of Section 6 in the
New Jersey Plan which bound state justices
by oath to federal treaties and legislative
acts:
That the Legislative acts of the U.S.
made by virtue & in pursuance of
the articles of Union, and all treaties
made & ratified under the authority
of the U.S. shall be the supreme law
of the respective States, as far as
those acts or treaties shall relate to
the said States, or their Citizens and
inhabitants & that the Judiciaries
of the several States shall be bound
thereby in their decisions, any
thing in the respective laws of the
individual States to the contrary
notwithstanding (2 Farrand, 28).
Martin’s amendment was unanimously
passed by the Convention and provided the
basis for the supremacy clause in Article VI
of the Constitution.
Martin’s intentions in proposing
this amendment were relatively complex,
but, as he later indicated at the Maryland
ratification convention, they did not include
granting federal courts judicial review over
state law (3 Farrand, 206, 222–23). The
congressional review of state law had just
been defeated for the second time after a brief
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but significant exchange in which its benefits
were contrasted with those of judicial review
by state courts. Sherman had argued that
congressional review was unnecessary since
state courts would be able to overturn laws
“contravening the Authority of the Union,”
and in response Madison had expressed his
doubt whether state courts could be trusted
as “guardians of the National authority and
interests” (2 Farrand, 27).
As soon as congressional review was
voted down, Martin sought to neutralize
Madison’s objections by resurrecting the
New Jersey Plan’s supremacy clause to
guarantee the loyalty of state justices to
federal law. If state justices were loyal to the
federal government, they could presumably
make the final determination whether
particular state laws were in conflict with
federal authority. Martin later claimed he
had also wanted to grant state courts original
jurisdiction, thus by implication giving
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
(3 Farrand, 286–87). However, there was no
explicit reference to such an arrangement in
the supremacy clause as proposed by Martin
on July 17. Moreover, Martin acknowledged
that he had intentionally omitted state
constitutions and bills of rights from the
“contrary notwithstanding” phrase, so these
could retain their priority over federal law
in state court decisions. Unlike others in
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the small-state leadership, he continued
to oppose a strong central government and
failed to recognize that granting original
jurisdiction to state justices could eventually
be used to justify the subordination of state
courts to the federal Supreme Court.
As a result of the Connecticut
Compromise, most other small-state
delegates supported centralization by the
end of July, so they no longer haggled over
amendments to diminish federal authority.
In the case of the judiciary, they could
actually give a bigger role to federal courts by
revising the structures they had advocated
to maximize state authority, the supremacy
clause and the original jurisdiction of state
justices. They had the additional advantage
that many in their leadership were more
familiar with the judiciary than most of the
large-state delegates (Wilson excluded) and
could implement the necessary modifications
for bringing this about.
But of course the small-state delegates
were shifting to a new course, and their
successful anti-nationalist tactics in earlier
deliberations set the stage for their even
more successful reversal of strategy that
would benefit nationalization at the expense
of state sovereignty.
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V.
The Committee of Detail
The Committee of Detail wrote the first
draft of the Constitution over a period of ten
days, between July 26 and August 6, during
which the Convention as a whole took a
vacation from proceedings.
Participation on the Committee of
Detail was limited to five members elected
by the Convention—Wilson, Rutledge,
Ellsworth, Randolph, and Gorham—three of
whom belonged to the de facto coalition that
later supported judicial review. Rutledge
and Ellsworth were probably chosen to
represent the southern and northern
factions of the small-state coalition, while
Randolph, Wilson, and Gorham represented
three of the four large states, respectively
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.
New York, the fourth large state, became
unrepresented at the Convention once Yates
and Lansing left in protest on July 10, eleven
days after Hamilton’s departure.
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Multiple Roles
All five of the delegates on the
Committee of Detail had played constructive
but supportive roles in their state
delegations. Wilson had been overshadowed
in floor discussions by Gouverneur Morris,
Ellsworth by Sherman, and Rutledge by the
often-superfluous enthusiasm of Charles
Pinckney. Gorham was probably chosen to
split the difference between Gerry and Rufus
King on the Massachusetts delegation, and
Randolph to split the difference between
Mason and Madison on the Virginia
delegation.
Gorham, a wealthy Boston merchant,
had briefly served as president of the
Continental Congress, and currently served
as chairman of the committee of the whole
at the Constitutional Convention. Gorham
replaced Washington on the few occasions
when he stepped down from the chair,
for example to rally support for slavery.
Randolph had served as both Attorney
General and Governor of Virginia, as a
member of the legislative committee that
had drawn up Virginia’s constitution and
bill of rights, and as the delegate honored
with presenting the Virginia Plan to the
Convention on May 29. Each member of
the Committee of Detail except Gorham had
benefitted from extensive legal experience,
each shared the central assumptions of
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the group he represented, and they had all
proven capable of effective compromise.
When the Committee of Detail was
elected, three of its members—Wilson,
Randolph, and Gorham—could be counted
on to support the thrust of the Virginia
Plan for imposing federal sovereignty with
more effectiveness than would have been
possible through exclusive dependence on
judicial review by state courts as specified
by Martin’s initial version of the supremacy
clause.
Wilson had expressed his views to
this effect on June 5 and July 21, and
Randolph and Gorham on July 18. These
three delegates also continued to advocate
congressional review, as indicated by
Wilson’s remarks to the Convention on
August 23 and by Randolph’s list of five
“Suggestions for Conciliating the Small
States,” a compromise proposal dated on
July 10 which included as an option that
the rejection of state law by Congress could
be appealed to the Supreme Court for a final
determination (3 Farrand, 56). Randolph’s
suggestion combined congressional and
judicial review in what might have amounted
to a major revision of the Virginia Plan, but
there is no evidence that anybody, Randolph
included, followed up on such a possibility.
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Meanwhile, Ellsworth, as a smallstate participant on the Committee of
Detail, supported both the Council of
Revision and judicial review by state courts,
while Rutledge, like Sherman and Martin,
apparently supported an exclusive reliance
on judicial review by state courts more or
less as entailed by the supremacy clause
and other portions of the New Jersey Plan.
What seems to have happened during the
Committee of Detail’s sessions over the
next ten days, as may be adduced from the
subsequent record, is that Wilson, Rutledge
and Ellsworth joined forces in working
toward an entirely new alternative—
the more inclusive use of judicial review
through a vertical integration of state and
federal courts. Seen in retrospect, their
shared process of discovery was in fact a
momentous inspiration that state supreme
court decisions upon the constitutionality of
state laws could be appealed to the federal
Supreme Court for a final dispensation.
Just as Proposition 5 of the New Jersey
Plan permitted other verdicts to be appealed
from state to federal courts, the judicial
review of state laws by state courts could
be appealed, and this appeals process could
effectively substitute for the principle of
congressional review advocated by Madison.
Such an arrangement would have been too
new, too intricate, and too controversial to
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impose at the Convention, but the description
of the judiciary in the Constitution could
be kept as open as possible and tailored to
permit and justify later modifications that
imposed judicial review.
The Committee of Detail kept no
records of deliberations, so there is no clear
evidence that this strategy was in the works
before the August 23 and 27 amendments
of Rutledge, Johnson, and Wilson. However,
the pains taken by this committee to grant
Congress full power in creating an appellate
judiciary but little if any power in curtailing
its authority once it was created suggest the
likelihood that it began to take root within
the Committee of Detail.
The committee’s modifications favorable
to judicial review were subtle, yet persistent
and ultimately successful. For example,
preceding the Connecticut Compromise,
small-state delegates had wanted to grant
state courts original jurisdiction of cases to
be settled by the Supreme Court, while largestate delegates had favored a compromise
guaranteeing the later creation of federal
appeals courts with at least temporary
status. Now, in the Committee of Detail, the
emphasis on temporary measures shifted to
postponement, since Congress could only
make its temporary assignments following
the acceptance of the Constitution by all
of the state ratifying conventions. This

104

modification permitted a fusion of large and
small-state goals, both the later creation of
a federal court system and the use of state
courts for original jurisdiction.
In retrospect, it seems obvious that this
arrangement was intended for permitting
Congress to bring state and federal courts
into a vertical hierarchy, and it also seems
probable that this hierarchy was intended
for imposing judicial review to reinforce
federal sovereignty. Such a possibility
becomes apparent in light of Wilson’s
abortive August 27 amendment and Section
25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act, probably
written by Ellsworth, both of which linked
judicial review with the use of state courts
for original jurisdiction. Since Wilson and
Ellsworth were knowledgeable in the law—
more knowledgeable, in fact, than most
other delegates at the Convention—it seems
likely that they realized while serving on
the Committee of Detail how the postponed
integration of state and federal judiciaries
would benefit their subsequent effort to
impose judicial review.
Drafting the Constitution
During the proceedings of the
Committee of Detail, two full-scale
preliminary drafts of the Constitution were
composed in the handwriting of Randolph
and Wilson, but often with marginal notes
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by Rutledge, the Committee of Detail’s
elected chairman. Randolph’s draft (often
described as the Randolph-Rutledge draft)
seems the earliest, since it was roughly
sketched out and significantly differed
from the Committee of Detail’s final draft
submitted to the Convention as a whole on
August 6. Wilson’s draft (often described as
the Wilson-Rutledge draft) was much closer
to the final draft in its content. It seems
likely that Wilson and perhaps Randolph
were chosen as amanuenses to transcribe
the wording found acceptable by the group
as a whole during these final sessions.
Wilson and Randolph are usually
credited with having dominated committee
proceedings because they authored these
two drafts and because the Committee
of Detail’s final draft was exclusively in
Wilson’s handwriting. However, this was not
necessarily the case, any more than the role
of executive secretaries in transcribing the
verbal instructions of their superiors while
they strive to explain their ideas.
It is significant that Randolph later
refused to sign the Constitution, and in light
of debate on the floor once the Convention
as a whole reconvened, it seems likely that
Rutledge and Ellsworth’s contributions
were more or less as important as those
of Wilson. What seems most likely that
Randolph’s authorship was as a secretary,
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while Wilson’s role was as a final editor.
What was actually said among the group
as a whole is anybody’s guess. Vigorous
group participation can be adduced from
Ellsworth’s casual remarks as reported by
his son to the historian, George Bancroft,
several decades later:
One day, upon my reading a paper
to him (in his illness), containing
an eulogium upon the late Gen.
Washington, which among other
things ascribed to him the founding
of the American Government, . . .
he (Judge E.) objected, saying that
President Washington’s influence
while in the convention was not very
great; at least not much as to the
forming of the present Constitution
of the United States in 1787. Judge
E. said that he himself was one of the
five who drew up that Constitution
(Brown, 169–70).
According to Farrand’s version of
Ellsworth’s conversation (3, 396-97), there
were six authors altogether, including
all members of the Committee of Detail
except Randolph. Instead, both Madison
and Hamilton were included, Hamilton’s
name probably having been confused with
Randolph’s, though Hamilton’s advocacy
of judicial review in The Federalist Papers
might have been taken into account.
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Ellsworth was supposedly feeble and
approaching death when he made his
remark, so such a mistake seems at least a
possibility. If this were the case, Ellsworth
merely conceded Madison’s ubiquitous
role at the Convention and emphasized
the shared participation of the Committee
as a whole without specifying the relative
importance of its particular members except
as might be implied from his mistake about
Randolph’s name.
By far the most important of the
Committee of Detail’s modifications was the
enlargement of Congress’s mandate to create
inferior federal courts as guaranteed by
the June 5 Madison compromise. Both the
Virginia Plan and Madison compromise had
granted Congress simply the power to set
these inferior courts in motion. In contrast,
the Committee of Detail’s three drafts gave
Congress comparatively broad powers in the
creation of the judiciary.
The first of these, the RandolphRutledge draft, granted Congress the power
to increase the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
“to such other cases, as the national
legislature may assign”:
But this supreme jurisdiction shall
be appellate only, except in <Cases of
Impeachmt. & (in)> those instances,
in which the legislature shall make
it original. And the legislature shall
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organize it . . . The whole or a part of
the jurisdiction aforesaid according to
the discretion of the legislature may
be assigned to the inferior tribunals,
as original tribunals (2 Farrand, 147;
italics added).
The Wilson-Rutledge draft somewhat
curtailed this freedom by specifically
designating the Supreme Court’s areas
of appellate and original jurisdiction. But
in compensation it granted Congress the
power to impose exceptions and regulations
whenever these seemed necessary:
In all the other Cases beforementioned, it [the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court] shall be appellate,
with such Exceptions and under
such Regulations as the Legislature
shall make. The Legislature may
assign any part of this Jurisdiction
above mentd., except the Trial of the
Executive, in the Manner and under
the Limitations which it shall think
proper to such inferior Courts as it
shall constitute from Time to Time (2
Farrand,173; italics added).
As it stood, the exceptions and regulations
clause, indicated by italics, was incorporated
word for word into the Committee of Detail’s
final preliminary draft.
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The wording of this clause was possibly
borrowed from the abortive Hamilton plan,
which had used exceptions to refer to
guidelines imposed by the Constitution
and regulations to refer to the power of
Congress to impose later modifications:
“. . . subject to such exceptions as are herein
contained and to such regulations as the
Legislature shall provide” (3 Farrand, 626;
italics added). However, the Committee of
Detail revised this distinction by combining
exceptions and regulations to augment the
power of Congress when it later created the
judiciary. Even with a comma added in the
Constitution’s final draft to separate the two
phrases (“with such exceptions, and under
such regulations”), the intent remained
plain for giving Congress full responsibility
in this task. And of course the primary
responsibility of Congress would remain
its choice whether to use state or federal
courts, or both, for the original jurisdiction
of federal cases. This choice had been twice
debated at the Convention, but was yet to
be resolved. Now Congress, and Congress
alone, was empowered to make it once the
Constitution was ratified.
The Committee of Detail’s final draft of
the Constitution also discouraged the use
of federal appeals courts by emphatically
stressing their temporary status: “. . . and
in such inferior Courts as shall, when
necessary, from time to time, be constituted
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by the Legislature of the United States” (2
Farrand, 186; italics added). This limitation
was justified by the passage of Rutledge’s
June 5 motion against permanent inferior
federal courts, and Rutledge and Ellsworth
might well have insisted upon its being
stressed in the Constitution. To emphasize
this point, the words “when necessary” were
added to the final draft of the Committee
of Detail. The Committee of Style later
deleted them, but without diminishing the
importance of the phrase, “from time to
time,” which was retained.
What is absolutely important to
recognize is that this emphasis on the use
of temporary appeals courts encouraged the
use of state courts for this purpose, since the
temporary courts already appointed under
the Articles of Confederation employed
state justices who could just as easily fulfill
their responsibility in state courts. The use
of state courts as appeals courts could be
temporary, but these courts would retain
a permanent role in state government,
permitting the appeal of cases from these
permanent lower courts to a permanent
Supreme Court.
Why appoint temporary federal appeals
courts to perform a temporary function
when permanent courts could do the same
thing on a continuing basis? Nobody can
be quoted as having advocating the vertical
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integration of state courts and the federal
Supreme Court because of their shared
permanence, but the wording of the passage
hardly discouraged such an interpretation.
The use of state courts for original
jurisdiction was also encouraged by the
vague reference to inferior courts and by
the manner in which the Supreme Court’s
original and appellate jurisdictions were
specified. In contrast to Article 9 of the
Virginia Plan, there was no effort to identify
the inferior tribunals to be granted original
jurisdiction. Instead, in Article XI, Section
I, of the Committee of Detail’s final draft
(equivalent to Article III, Section I, in the
final draft of the Constitution), the wording
specified “such inferior Courts as shall,
when necessary, from time to time, be
constituted by the Legislature of the United
States” (2 Farrand, 186; italics added).
Section 3 (Section 2 of the final draft) listed
specific areas of jurisdiction, but there was
no indication what courts would be assigned
original jurisdiction.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of inferior
courts could only be deduced by the process
of subtraction. First the full jurisdiction
(both original and appellate) of the Supreme
Court was listed:
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court shall extend to all cases
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arising under laws passed by the
Legislature of the United States; to all
cases affecting Ambassadors, other
Public Ministers and Consuls; to
the trial of impeachments of officers
of the United States; to all cases of
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
to controversies between two or more
States, (except such as shall regard
Territory or Jurisdiction) between a
State and Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States,
and between a State or the Citizens
thereof and foreign States, citizens or
subjects (2 Farrand, 186).
Next the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdictions were listed: “In cases of
impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be party, this
jurisdiction shall be original.”
Finally, the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdictions (i.e., the original jurisdictions
of inferior courts) were subtracted from this
total:
In all the other cases beforementioned, it [the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court] shall be appellate,
with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Legislature shall
make (2 Farrand, 186; italics added).
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Only by subtracting the second list from the
first—eight items minus four—could readers
determine that the original jurisdiction of
inferior courts would include,
•

Cases arising under laws passed by
Congress,

•

Controversies between citizens of
different states,

•

Controversies between citizens and
foreign states, and

•

Controversies between citizens and
foreign subjects.

As earlier indicated, state justices were
already involved in deciding these cases
under the Articles of Confederation, so
here too the participation of state courts
would have seemed entirely appropriate.
Remarkably, the wording in all other cases
likewise compelled the establishment of
inferior courts as soon as possible and
implied by omission the possibility that
these could be state courts. There was no
wording to suggest otherwise.
The extent to which the Committee of
detail wanted to stress the full authority of
Congress to incorporate state courts within
the federal judiciary was also indicated
by the so-called assignment clause that
followed the list of jurisdictions in the final
draft of the Committee of Detail:
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The Legislature may assign any part
of the jurisdiction above mentioned
(except the trial of the President of
the United States) in the manner, and
under the limitations which it shall
think proper, to such Inferior Courts,
as it shall constitute from time to
time (2 Farrand, 186).
The Randolph-Rutledge draft had used
the word “assign” in describing the power
of Congress to increase or diminish the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction (2
Farrand, 147). Later, in the Wilson-Rutledge
draft, the word “assign” was used in a more
emphatic construction that provided the
basis for its use in Wilson’s final preliminary
draft (2 Farrand, 173). However, the clause
became entirely redundant once the role
of Congress in creating inferior courts was
stressed in the exceptions and regulations
clause.
Moreover, once the Supreme Court’s
full original and appellate jurisdictions
were specified in the Constitution itself,
the mandate of Congress to organize the
judicial system was automatically tied to
the “assignment” of establishing inferior
federal courts, exactly the issue at stake in
the New Jersey plan and June 5 and July
18 debates. Consequently, the assignment
clause could be deleted, as it was by a
unanimous vote on August 27, three weeks
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after the Committee of Detail submitted its
preliminary draft of the Constitution to the
Convention as a whole (2 Farrand, 431).
Nevertheless, the use of this clause in the
Committee of Detail’s final preliminary draft
indicates the importance attached to it by at
least a majority of this committee.
Deliberate Compromise
It should be emphasized that the
deliberate use of omission and indirect
reference in the Committee of Detail’s final
draft of the Constitution was probably
intended in the spirit of compromise. The
June 5 and July 18 amendments had not
mentioned state courts, and the New Jersey
Plan, which did, had been rejected in its
entirety by the Convention. Moreover, there
had been no second effort to submit to a
vote the vertical integration of state and
federal courts, such as Martin had made
for the supremacy clause. Since the Official
Proceedings of the Convention that were
provided to the Committee of Detail specified
neither a mixed nor an exclusively federal
judicial system, the Committee properly
kept both possibilities viable. The choice
could later be resolved, either during the
Convention or when Congress fulfilled its
mandate in appointing inferior courts.
Randolph could accept this compromise
as a holding action that deferred debate until
others could join in resisting an integrated
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judicial system, and Gorham was possibly
unaware of the full implications of what was
transpiring. However, Wilson, Rutledge and
Ellsworth must have taken full satisfaction
with the wording of the final draft, since
its postponement of a final decision could
also be interpreted as having empowered
Congress to integrate state and federal
courts. And of course it was Ellsworth who
subsequently took advantage of this wording
once elected to the U.S. Senate by drafting
the Judiciary Act to give the Supreme Court
its power of judicial review over state laws,
if on a permanent—not temporary—basis.
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VI.
August 1787
The continuing relationship among
members of the Committee of Detail once
debate resumed in the Convention as a whole
bears close examination. Gorham’s reduced
participation in convention proceedings
suggests the possibility that he played a
relatively minor role in having drafted the
Constitution. His spoken contributions
as tabulated based on Madison’s records
actually declined by a third compared to his
contributions during the equivalent period
immediately preceding the Committee of
Detail. Likewise, Randolph fell into hostile
disputes with his fellow members of the
Committee at least five times over the
next fourteen sessions, suggesting his
dissatisfaction with the shared perspective
of the rest of the committee.
Meanwhile, the verbal participatation
of both Rutledge and Ellsworth increased
dramatically on the floor of the Convention.
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Rutledge’s contributions doubled and
Ellsworth’s increased by two-thirds. In
absolute numbers, Ellsworth’s total of 53
spoken contributions from August 6 to
August 23, when he left the Convention,
exceeded Wilson’s (49) and was surpassed
only by Gouverneur Morris’s (59) and
Madison’s (55). The tally of contributions of
other delegates trailed at a distance: Mason
(39), Sherman (36), Pinckney (34), Randolph
(30), Rutledge (25), Mercer (23), Williamson
(22), Gorham (20), King (18), Butler and
Dickinson (16 apiece), etc.
Silent during his first three weeks
in attendance, Ellsworth became a major
presence while debating the merits of the
Constitution’s wording. It may be conceded
that most of his contributions were of
minor importance, but their frequency and
specificity suggest an intense proprietary
concern in promoting the Committee of
Detail’s final draft of the Constitution he
had a hand in composing. Whenever the
wording of particular contexts was taken
into consideration, he seems to have felt
obligated to help explain the Committee’s
intentions.
The style of debate also radically shifted
once the Committee of Detail submitted to
the Convention its preliminary draft of the
Constitution. This draft necessarily replaced
the Virginia Plan as the Convention’s
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working agenda, and rhetoric was minimized
as delegates concentrated their attention on
the wording of specific amendments, swiftly
turning from one to another as support by
the convention as a whole was determined.
During this period, the five members of the
Committee of Detail were outspoken in their
discussion of amendments and frequently
lapsed into exchanges among themselves as
if they were seeking improved clarification
of their shared objectives. Thirty-four
exchanges may be counted in which they
spoke in clusters of two, three, or four.
Others joined in, of course, but there seems
to have been sustained “inside” dialogue
among members of the Committee of Detail.
Throughout August the group also
continued to hold independent sessions of
their own, though none of these are recorded.
Usually, Wilson, Ellsworth, and Rutledge
presented their arguments in unison, and
sometimes with Gorham’s participation. On
the other hand, the occasional hostility of
Randolph’s contributions anticipated his
later refusal to sign the Constitution and his
attack on the federal judiciary at the 1788
Virginia ratifying convention.
The two occasions when the veto power
over state and federal laws was introduced
in early August, the interaction among the
Committee of Detail suggests that Wilson
might have forgotten himself and broken
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a prior understanding to avoid debate on
the issue. On August 15, for example, John
Mercer (a friend of Martin and fellow delegate
from Maryland) specifically attacked judicial
review as a usurpation of legislative power:
He disapproved of the Doctrine that
the Judges as expositors of the
Constitution should have authority
to declare a law void. He thought
laws ought to be well and cautiously
made, and then to be uncontroulable
(2 Farrand, 298).
Dickinson expressed his agreement,
but confessed he “was at a loss what
expedient to substitute.” Sherman warned
against judges “meddling in politics” in
their capacity as members of the Council
of Revision, after which Gorham pointedly
suggested abandoning the issue. Wilson,
however, could not refrain from launching
into a speech advocating the prevention of
legislative tyranny by granting “sufficient
self-defensive power either to the Executive
or Judiciary department” [italics added].
Immediately, Rutledge complained of
the tediousness of the proceedings, and
Ellsworth joined in by declaring, “We grow
more & more skeptical as we proceed. If
we do not decide soon, we shall be unable
to come to any decision.” Obviously they
wanted to terminate Wilson’s abortive
effort. Here Wilson seems to have strayed
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into arguments, which touched upon
judicial review, whereupon Rutledge and
Ellsworth interceded to keep the issue out
of discussion. Just five months later at
their respective ratifying conventions, both
Wilson and Ellsworth ringingly declared the
necessity and inevitability of judicial review
as the bulwark of constitutional government.
On August 23, a comparable exchange
occurred when Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina introduced for the last time
Madison’s notion of congressional review
over state laws (2 Farrand, 390). Madison
remarked that he had always supported
the principle, but “thought the modification
might be made better.” There is no indication
what he meant by “the modification,” but it
seems more than likely that he was referring
to the substitution of judicial review at a
later time. When Sherman, Mason, and
Williamson repeated their longstanding
objections to congressional review, Wilson
once again seems to have forgotten himself,
this time by using the issue of congressional
review to emphasize “the keystone wanted to
compleat the wide arch of government, we
are raising.”
Once again Rutledge and Ellsworth
came to the rescue in response to his tactic.
Rutledge chastised Wilson with the ominous
warning, “If nothing else, this alone would
damn and ought to damn the Constitution.
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Will any state ever agree to be bound hand
& foot in this manner?” Rutledge neglected
to mention how judicial review might be
used as an alternative, but as later became
obvious, one of its most useful benefits
would be its imposition of federal sovereignty
on a more limited basis. Then Ellsworth
added his important but usually overlooked
explanation that there would also be serious
technical difficulties in implementing
congressional review, since all state laws
would need to be reviewed either by Congress
or by its appointed agents (by implication
inclusive of federal judges). Ellsworth also
left unspoken judicial review’s primary
advantage already mentioned by Jefferson
in his June 20 letter to Madison, that it
would eliminate this problem, since the only
laws reviewed by the Supreme Court would
be those appealed from inferior courts.
Soon the vote was taken on the
floor of the Convention, and once again
congressional review was defeated as
opposed to judicial review, which remained
free and clear of having been rejected at the
Convention.
For business reasons Ellsworth
departed from the Convention by August
24, but both Sherman and Johnson took
his place in floor proceedings. The day after
Ellsworth’s departure, Sherman spoke
up five times, and on August 27 Johnson
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dropped his modest bombshell with his
carefully worded amendment that granted
the Supreme Court the authority to interpret
the Constitution. It can be speculated that
as usual Sherman, Ellsworth, and Johnson
were acting as a team, and that Johnson’s
amendment could have been proposed by
any of the three, or, for that matter, by
Rutledge or Wilson. Except for Wilson, all of
these delegates had held their silence when
Gerry and Martin raised the issue of judicial
review on June 4 and July 21.
Twice again subsequent to the
Committee of Detail’s meetings, on August
15 and 23, the issue surfaced, but both
times they succeeded in preventing its
discussion. Then, when amendments upon
the judiciary came under discussion on
August 23 and 27, Rutledge and Johnson
put through their two quick and easily
overlooked amendments which made the
necessary modifications to facilitate the
later adoption of judicial review, and which
did this without specifically referring to
judicial review. On both occasions debate
was minimal, so these amendments could
be adopted almost as quickly as they were
introduced.
A third amendment, proposed by
Wilson, would then have incorporated
judicial review into the Constitution itself,
but, again, it would have done this without
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having specifically referred to it by name or
by the powers it granted. As earlier indicated,
Wilson’s amendment was quickly withdrawn
without debate.
Strategy Considerations
Considered in retrospect, the three
amendments of Rutledge, Johnson, and
Wilson suggest a major advance in strategy.
In the Constitution’s original draft submitted
by the Committee of Detail, there was no
explicit provision for judicial review and the
possibility of vertical integration between
state and federal courts was indicated only
by omission. It was with Rutledge’s August
23 amendment that Martin’s supremacy
clause was expanded to establish loyalty
to the Constitution itself as a primary
responsibility of all state justices. Indeed,
Rutledge’s careful sequence in his wording
of the amendment gave the Constitution first
priority among federal laws, statutes, and
treaties to be granted supremacy by state
judges, thus guaranteeing the role of state
justices as officers of the court primarily
responsible to the Constitution:
This Constitution & the laws of the
U.S. made in pursuance thereof, and
all Treaties made under the authority
of the U.S. shall be the supreme law

125

of the several States . . . (2 Farrand,
389; italics added).
This emphasis on loyalty to the
Constitution itself had already been featured
in Article 14 of the Virginia Plan (“bound
by oath to support the articles of Union”),
but it had been excluded in both the New
Jersey Plan and Martin’s amendment
later identified as the Supremacy Clause.
With his amendment Rutledge resurrected
this portion of the Virginia Plan, but his
purpose at this stage in the Convention was
probably doubled, first to secure the loyalty
of state officials to the federal government
as Madison had first intended, but also
to validate by this means the role of the
state judiciary in the enforcement of the
Constitution. Rutledge likewise eliminated
Martin’s anti-nationalist escape clause by
including state constitutions in the “contrary
notwithstanding” phrase that specified the
state documents to be subordinated to the
federal Constitution:
And the Judges in the several
States shall be bound thereby
in their decisions, any thing in
the Constitutions or laws of the
several States, to the contrary
notwithstanding (ibid.; italics added).
Rutledge thus inverted the small-state
strategy of Martin’s July 17 amendment by
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giving the federal Constitution final authority
over all state laws, state constitutions
included, but with state courts granted their
authority in defending the Constitution.
State justices would have the opportunity
to veto both state laws and those portions of
state constitutions they found in conflict with
the federal Constitution. Once Rutledge’s
amendment was unanimously accepted, the
only ingredients needed to impose judicial
review by the federal Supreme Court were
the vertical integration of state and federal
courts and an appeals process granting the
Supreme Court its final authority.
Just as Rutledge laid the groundwork
for the judicial review of state law with his
August 23 amendment, Johnson did the
same for the judicial review of both state and
federal law by his August 27 amendment
four days later. Johnson very likely proposed
his amendment in response to the adoption
of Rutledge’s amendment, since the two
amendments respectively held state courts
and the Supreme Court itself primarily
responsible to the federal Constitution.
Madison had set the stage for Johnson’s
amendment on July 18, when he resolved
a relatively minor issue by proposing “that
the jurisdiction [of the Supreme Court] shall
extend to all cases arising under the national
laws” (2 Farrand, 46). The preposition
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“under” had been used in the supremacy
clause, so its addition to Article III could
be justified for having provided symmetry
between Articles III and VI pertaining to the
adjudication of national laws in both state
and federal courts.
When Madison and Gouverneur Morris
likewise sought on August 27 to extend
the Supreme Court’s judicial power to all
controversies “to which the US shall be a
party,” Johnson quickly responded by adding
the Constitution itself as yet another subject
of its judicial power. This modification might
have seemed harmless enough, since it
provided comparable symmetry between
Articles III and VI by expanding Madison’s
“arising under” clause to feature the
Supreme Court’s authority relevant to the
Constitution as well as treaties and national
laws:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all
cases both in law and equity arising
under this Constitution and the laws
of the United States, and treaties
made . . . under their authority . . .”
(2 Farrand, 430, 576; italics added).
Now the Supreme Court would exercise
two presumably independent functions,
of judging all federal law and of remaining
loyal to the Constitution itself.
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Once these two functions were
combined however, the Supreme Court
would necessarily be able to determine the
validity of federal law based on its agreement
with the Constitution. Granted, this power
was not specifically declared until the
1803 Marbury v. Madison decision, but
wording that established the defense of the
Constitution as the primary obligation of the
Supreme Court left the possibility open to
later interpretation.
Another important effect of Johnson’s
amendment, often overlooked, was that it
gave identical status to the Constitution in
both the federal Supreme Court and state
courts, permitting an appeals arrangement
between the two once state courts were
granted original jurisdiction. Since both
state courts and the Supreme Court were
obliged to defend the supremacy of the
Constitution, the state courts’ judicial
review of state laws possibly in conflict with
the Constitution could be appealed for final
dispensation by the Supreme Court. Exactly
the same principles obtained at both levels,
so the Supreme Court could review the
decision of lower courts on a comparable
basis.
Rutledge’s amendment thus established
the basis for judicial review of state laws
as later guaranteed by the Judiciary Act,
and Johnson’s amendment, established
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the basis for judicial review of both state
and federal laws in conflict with the federal
Constitution, in the latter case as confirmed
by the 1803 Marbury v. Madison decision.
Madison quickly recognized the
implication of Johnson’s wording that
any federal law could be judged and
rejected by the Supreme Court based on
its constitutionality. Opposed to such an
arrangement, he expressed his concern that
judicial review might have been intended and
suggested the Convention was “going too far”
if this were the case. He argued that the power
of the Supreme Court should be properly
limited to “cases of a Judiciary Nature,” i.e.,
those cases submitted by adversary parties
for judicial determination (Berger, 216). He
elaborated his objection that “the right of
expounding the Constitution in cases not
of this nature ought not to be given to that
Department [the Supreme Court].” Others
at the Convention whose identities remain
undisclosed assured him that there was no
threat of judicial review, since the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction would of course be
“constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary
Nature” (italics added).
By “cases of a judiciary nature,” these
delegates probably meant cases in which
the law was applied, as opposed to cases in
which the law itself could be vetoed. Swayed
by the momentum of proceedings, Madison
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reluctantly joined in the unanimous
vote supporting Johnson’s amendment.
However, as he warned, the combination
of his and Johnson’s amendments, both of
which passed unanimously, did establish
the basis for Marbury v. Madison, giving
the Supreme Court the power to judge the
constitutionality of federal laws.
Perhaps because he was rattled by
debate, Madison neglected to mention in
his Notes the next major amendment under
consideration once two minor revisions
proposed by Rutledge were unanimously
accepted. As summarized by the official
Journal, but not by Madison himself,
this overlooked but crucially important
amendment offered by Wilson finally gave
the Convention the opportunity to vote on
an appeals system that integrated state and
federal courts as proposed on June 5, July
18, and in the New Jersey plan.
Law and Fact Language
Delegates had voted against the New
Jersey plan in its entirety; now they would
be able to vote specifically on the vertical
integration of state and federal courts,
and in an arrangement whereby both laws
and factual evidence adjudicated by state
courts could be appealed to the Supreme
Court. The official Journal mentioned this
abortive amendment without disclosing its
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source, and, as already indicated, Madison
altogether neglected to mention it, so
constitutional historians have overlooked
its importance. However, the amendment as
described in the Journal can be conflated
with its discussion by Morris and Wilson
as reported by Madison, an exchange that
otherwise seems disconnected with earlier
proceedings, thus suggesting Wilson’s
authorship as well as the full significance of
his proposal:
Journal:
It was moved and seconded to agree
to the following amendment. In all
the other cases before-mentioned
original jurisdiction shall be in the
Courts of the several States but with
appeal both as to Law and fact to
the courts of the United States, with
such exceptions and under such
regulations, as the Legislatures shall
make (2 Farrand, 424).
Madison’s Notes:
Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know
what was meant by the words “In
all the cases before mentioned it
(jurisdiction) shall be appellate with
such exceptions &c.” whether it
extended to matters of fact as well as
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law and to cases of Common law as
well as Civil law.
Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed
meant facts as well as law & Common
as well as Civil law. The jurisdiction
of the federal Court of Appeals had he
said been so construed (2 Farrand,
431).
Journal:
The last motion being withdrawn
. . . (2 Farrand, 424).
Here, at last, was the keystone that would
have imbedded judicial review in the
Constitution without further effort. It was
far more significant than earlier proposals
for integrating state and federal courts, since
it specifically permitted state court decisions
to be appealed to the Supreme Court and
since its phrase “both as to law and fact”
could be construed to permit the review
of state laws based on their compatibility
with the Constitution as guaranteed by the
Rutledge and Johnson amendments that
had just been accepted. Also significant was
the probable authorship by Wilson since
it was Wilson who responded to Morris’s
question about the “law and fact” clause”
by explaining the intent of the amendment.
The “law and fact” clause had not been
mentioned in previous convention debate
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upon the judiciary, so Morris appropriately
asked what it meant in the context of
the amendment, and it was Wilson who
responded by trying to reconstruct its
intended meaning. Who else but the delegate
who presents an amendment with entirely
new wording could be expected to clarify
this wording to such an assembly?
In his response to Morris, Wilson also
disclosed that the wording, “both as to law
and fact,” and thus probably the entire
amendment, was chosen by the Committee
of Detail, which he simply described as “the
Committee.” As explained earlier, those
among the Committee who could support
this amendment would have included
Wilson, Rutledge, and Ellsworth, with
Gorham having played a peripheral role and
with Randolph opposed to such an addition
to the Constitution. Perhaps disingenuously,
Wilson argued that the wording seemed
appropriate to the Committee because of its
earlier use by the federal Court of Appeals,
suggesting that it granted no broader powers
than already exercised under the Articles of
Confederation for judging the use of law as
applied to facts.
Nevertheless, a more threatening
interpretation would have been possible if
the “law and fact” clause could also have
been interpreted to permit judgments
upon law itself independent of fact, or as
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illustrated by fact, to be appealed from state
to federal courts. With fact-granted priority,
appeals would primarily involve jury trials,
but with law-given priority, law itself could
be appealed, and this would have entailed
judicial review. Not surprisingly, the “law and
fact” clause was familiar to both Ellsworth
and Wilson, since Ellsworth had acted as a
justice on the Court of Appeals, and Wilson
as a lawyer who had appeared before it in
the celebrated Olmstead case. Wilson had
likewise used the words “law and fact” as
the title of one of his early fragments in the
Committee of Detail (2 Farrand, 157). It
therefore seems likely that Wilson himself,
serving as the Committee’s amanuensis, had
drafted the amendment as a contingency
whose controversial importance was fully
recognized by Ellsworth and himself,
and at least to an extent by others on the
Committee.
That Wilson proposed such an
amendment might have been surprising
to some delegates, since he had been one
of the two authors of the June 6 Madison
compromise whose purpose was to avoid
the use of the state judiciary for original
jurisdiction. Now, however, it was obvious
that he completely reversed himself,
apparently because he felt that with the
Convention’s rejection of congressional

135

review, nationalism would best be served by
switching his allegiance to judicial review.
Just as Rutledge, once a small-state
advocate, based his July 23 amendment
on the Virginia Plan featured by the
nationalists, Wilson, once opposed to smallstate objectives, was trying to resurrect a
portion of the New Jersey Plan featured by
the small-state faction. By earlier standards,
the two might have seemed to be rather
dramatically switching roles, but their
reversal was fully justified if they shared a
new goal at this point in deliberations, the
eventual imposition of judicial review as the
principal guarantee of federal sovereignty.
With the addition of Wilson’s
amendment, combined with the Rutledge
and Johnson amendments, the principle
of judicial review would have been fully
written into the Constitution, though in a
piecemeal arrangement that postponed its
justification until later interpretation by the
Supreme Court. As indicated in the Journal,
Wilson’s amendment was withdrawn after
brief discussion without being voted upon.
Why? Probably because it was considered
too controversial. Everything would be lost
if it were rejected by the Convention, or,
worse yet, if it were incorporated into the
Constitution, but only to rally an effective
opposition at state ratifying conventions. As
drafted by the Committee of Detail, Article III
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compounded by the Rutledge and Johnson
amendments already gave Congress the
implicit power to impose judicial review at
a later time. Why let redundant explicitness
jeopardize something already in the works?
It seems probable that Wilson
spontaneously decided on August 27,
perhaps without consulting the others, that
the time was ripe to submit the amendment
to the Convention for a final showdown in
giving state courts original jurisdiction and
thus permitting judicial review. Rutledge
and Johnson’s amendments had just laid
the basis for judicial review by featuring
the primary authority of the Constitution in
both state courts and the federal Supreme
Court. Now, despite Madison’s admonitions,
the keystone could be added, letting judicial
review by state courts be appealed to the
Supreme Court. However, as already
indicated, Wilson withdrew his amendment
from consideration. It may be speculated
that Wilson took it upon himself to present
the amendment, but that Rutledge once
again exerted a restraining influence, as he
had on August 15 and 23, and convinced
Wilson to withdraw it for a later time.
Another possibility would be that
Wilson did indeed act as a spokesman for
others on the Committee of Detail, Rutledge
included, but that other delegates, either
friendly or hostile—perhaps Dickinson or
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Morris—prevailed upon them to defer to
Congress any final judgment in the matter.
In either case, it seems likely that Wilson
himself withdrew his amendment. Just as
explicit reference to the vertical integration
of state and federal courts had been excluded
from earlier motions and amendments,
Wilson was apparently convinced to carry
on the strategy of omission even now, at the
final stage of the Convention. As it turned
out, Section 25 of the Judiciary Act would
later serve this purpose, and with better and
more specific guidelines for determining the
scope and procedures of judicial review.
In response to Wilson’s remarks,
Dickinson took the opportunity to propose
a relatively narrow substitute amendment
permitting appeals based on both “law and
fact” without specifying whether state courts
would be granted original jurisdiction. Once
again, the full significance of Dickinson’s
amendment following that of Wilson is
best clarified by collating the Journal and
Madison’s Notes, in this instance once Wilson
withdrew his amendment as indicated in the
Journal:
Madison’s Notes:
Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the
word “appellate” the words “both as
to law & fact which was agreed to
nem: con: (2 Farrand, 431).
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Journal:
It was moved and seconded to
amend the clause to read “In cases
of impeachment, cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be Party, this jurisdiction
shall be original In all the other
cases before mentioned it shall be
appellate both as to law and fact
with such exceptions and under such
regulations as the Legislature shall
make” which passed in the affirmative
(2 Farrand, 425).
Here Dickinson seems to have tried to
salvage as much of Wilson’s amendment as
possible based on Wilson’s definition of the
“law and fact” clause for later establishing
judicial review pertinent to law alone.
Dickinson’s substitute amendment was
unanimously accepted as what might
have seemed a harmless component of the
withdrawn amendment. His wording was
probably found suitable in guaranteeing
the full appellate authority of the Supreme
Court regardless of who would be granted
original jurisdiction. Whether state and
federal courts were integrated, the principle
would insure an effective appeals process,
fact linked with the law, and if and when

139

judicial review itself were imposed, with
the law emphasized rather than fact, the
wording of Dickinson’s amendment would
help to justify it. Meanwhile, those opposed
to judicial review could support Dickinson’s
amendment as a technicality for improving
the appeals process without mandating
either judicial review or the fixed integration
of state and federal courts.
Apparently, it did not occur any of
the delegates that anti-nationalists would
later challenge the Constitution because of
a relatively superficial consideration, the
possibility that jury trial verdicts as opposed
to state and local laws could be reversed by
the Supreme Court based on the law and
fact clause, thus imposing an extra burden
on litigants to make their case again at a
different location. However, everybody
present at the Convention was hurrying to
complete its business and eager to dispense
with specific issues without exploring them
too much in depth. The timing was perfect
both to lay the foundation for judicial review
and to postpone its implementation until
Congress established inferior federal courts.
Style Matters
Given the intricacy of the strategy to
postpone the implementation of judicial
review, it should be no surprise that in
the final draft of the Constitution, as in
all earlier drafts, Articles III and VI were
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kept brief and deliberately void of direct
reference to judicial review. These two
articles turned out to be what might have
seemed the briefest and vaguest part of the
Constitution, yet they were phrased with
such precision that Gouverneur Morris, who
was principally responsible for the wording
in the final draft, later complained that here
alone, in the description of the judiciary,
he was prevented by fellow delegates from
making the stylistic modifications he felt
were needed:
That instrument [the Constitution]
was written by the fingers, which write
this letter. Having rejected redundant
and equivocal terms, I believed it to
be as clear as our language would
permit; excepting, nevertheless, a
part of what relates to the judiciary.
On that subject, conflicting opinions
had been maintained with so much
professional astuteness, that it
became necessary to select phrases,
which expressing my own notions
would not alarm others, nor shock
their self-love, and to the best of
my recollection, this was the only
part which passed without cavil (3
Farrand, 420; italics added).
Morris did not identify the delegates who
interfered with his effort to improve the
wording upon the judiciary, but these
probably included Madison and Johnson,
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also members of the Committee of Style
(Johnson as its chairman), as well as
Wilson, who was not a member, but a fellow
Pennsylvania delegate permitted to inspect
and revise Morris’s final version because he
had shared in authoring the initial version
by the Committee of Detail.
Both Johnson and Wilson would
have been motivated to defend the original
wording of these amendments from stylistic
modifications, since the later imposition of
judicial review depended on a precise choice
of words in order to convey the intentionally
broad implications of the exceptions
and regulations clause, the ambiguous
designation of inferior federal courts, and
the primary role given to the Constitution in
both Article III and the supremacy clause. To
meddle too much with the style of Articles
III and VI could well have thwarted their
purpose—to be unclear in the specifics, but
absolutely precise in granting Congress the
power to take advantage of these specifics
when it created inferior courts as mandated
by Article III.
The rest of the Constitution was
straightforward and could therefore be
revised with relative latitude for stylistic
purposes, but the wording upon the judiciary
was fraught with intricate legal implications
crucial to the establishment of the federal
judiciary two years later, when judicial
review could finally be imposed.
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VII.
The 1788
Ratifying Conventions
Once the Convention was over and done
with, the issue of judicial review came into
better focus in public debate. Most notably,
Wilson and Ellsworth vigorously advocated
judicial review at their respective ratifying
conventions. Each played a dominant
role in defending the Constitution during
proceedings, and each apparently felt free
to declare his support of judicial review
because federalists already dominated his
state convention. On December 7, 1787,
Wilson explained to fellow delegates at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention how
federal law would be subjected to judicial
review:
If a law should be made inconsistent
with those powers bestowed by this
instrument [the Constitution] in
Congress, the judges, as a consequence
of their independence, and the
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particular powers of government
being defined, will declare such law
to be null and void. For the power of
the constitution predominates. Any
thing therefore, that shall be enacted
by Congress contrary thereto, will not
have the force of law (McMaster and
Stone, 354).
Obviously, Wilson was referring here
to federal law alone, but there is every
indication he wanted to apply judicial review
to state law as well.
A month later, on January 7, 1788,
Ellsworth explained to fellow delegates at
the Connecticut ratifying convention the
importance of judicial review for both state
and federal law:
If the general legislature should at any
time overleap their limits, the judicial
department is a constitutional check.
If the United States go beyond their
powers, if they make a law which
the Constitution does not authorize,
it is void; and the judicial power,
the national judges, who to secure
their impartiality, are to be made
independent, will declare it to be void.
On the other hand, if the states go
beyond their limits, if they make a
law which is a usurpation upon the
federal government the law is void;
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and upright, independent judges will
declare it to be so (3 Farrand, 240–
41).
Judicial leverage was essential,
Ellsworth argued, as a “coercive principle” to
bring the separate states into a single union:
Hence we see how necessary for the
Union is a coercive principle. No man
pretends the contrary: we all see and
feel this necessity. The only question
is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or
a coercion of arms? A necessary
consequence of their principles
is a war of the states one against
the other. I am for coercion by law
that coercion which acts only upon
delinquent individuals (3 Farrand,
241).
Notably missing from Ellsworth’s explanation
was any indication whether his “upright,
independent judges” would be making their
decisions in state or federal courts. As it
turned out, both would participate, and
Ellsworth’s recognition of this necessity
seems probable in light of his ambiguous
description of these judges.
Ellsworth’s candor was remarkable, probably
because he went entirely unchallenged by
others. According to one observer at the
convention, “He [Ellsworth] took a very
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active part in defending the Constitution.
Scarcely a single objection was made but
what he answered. His energetic reasoning
bore down all before it” (Brown, 171).
Nor did the possibility of judicial review
go totally unnoticed by others around the
country, and to at least a few it seemed a
strategy might be in the works to impose
judicial review at a later time. In a series
of articles published in 1788 under the
pseudonym of Brutus, Robert Yates explained
at length how judicial review could lead to
centralization in the federal government
because of the gradual accumulation of
legal precedents. The gradual accumulation
of Supreme Court decisions would produce
an exponential increase in the power of the
judiciary, and sooner or later federal justices
would be able to mold the government into
almost any shape they pleased. In response
Hamilton added the Numbers 78 to 83 essays
of The Federalist, in which he challenged the
likelihood that the courts would ever gain
this much power. However, there was an
unmistakable suggestion that he was not
necessarily opposed to such an outcome,
and he did declare his enthusiastic support
of the vertical integration of state and federal
courts:
. . . the national and State systems
are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE.
The courts of the latter will of
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course be natural auxiliaries to the
execution of the laws of the Union,
and an appeals from them will as
naturally lie to that tribunal which is
destined to unite and assimilate the
principles of national justice and the
rules of national decisions (Federalist
81, 536).
Moreover, Hamilton defended the necessity
of judicial review:
The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in fact, and
must be regarded by the judges, as a
fundamental law, It therefore belongs
to them to ascertain its meaning, as
well as the meaning of any particular
act proceeding from the legislative
body. If there should happen to be
an irreconcilable variance between
the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other
words, the Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute, the intentions
of the people to the intention of their
agents (Federalist 78, 506).
Combined, judicial review and the vertical
integration of state and federal courts
would necessarily give federal judges the
power to veto state laws, and this power
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would necessarily help to defend national
sovereignty.
Hamilton’s description of the role of
the judiciary closely resembled the design
already promoted by the small circle of
convention delegates who had wanted to
postpone the implementation of judicial
review. However, his arguments significantly
differed from his own proposal for the role
of the judiciary in the so-called Hamilton
Plan he had presented at the Convention (1
Farrand, 292–93). It therefore seems more
probable that Hamilton was influenced by a
plan already in the works than, as has often
been suggested, that his discussion of the
judiciary in his final Federalist papers first
introduced this plan, setting the stage for
the inclusion of Section 25 in the Judiciary
Act.
As hoped and expected, opponents to
the Constitution at the 1788 state ratifying
conventions focused their concerns on
other issues than judicial review. The lack
of a bill of rights and the appeal of jury
trials to higher courts primarily dominated
their attention. Nevertheless, Mason,
Randolph, and Martin warned at their
respective ratifying conventions against the
likelihood of a judicial takeover. All three
had participated in the Convention, and
they were more suspicious than others
of the possibility of a hidden agenda for
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imposing judicial review within the system
of appellate jurisdiction yet to be established
by Congress. Mason was perhaps the most
persuasive of the three. On August 27,
he had drafted notes suggesting his own
modified plan to integrate state and federal
courts for appeals exclusively based on law
and not fact (2 Farrand, 432–33). However,
in notes compiled in the final days of the
Convention, he had included the absorption
of state courts into the federal judiciary as
one of the sixteen reasons why he refused to
sign the Constitution:
The Judiciary of the United States
is so constructed and extended,
as to absorb and destroy the
judiciaries of the several States;
thereby rendering law as tedious,
intricate, and expensive, and justice
as unattainable, by a great part of
the community . . . and enabling the
rich to oppress and ruin the poor (2
Farrand, 638).
These state judiciaries would have been
destroyed, he felt, through their loss of
autonomy by having been incorporated into
the federal judiciary.
At the Virginia ratifying convention,
Mason also warned more specifically against
the absorption of state courts into the federal
judiciary:
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What is there left to the state courts?
Will any gentleman be pleased,
candidly, fairly, and without sophistry,
to show us what remains? There is
no limitation . . . The inferior courts
are to be as numerous as Congress
may think proper. They are to be of
whatever nature they please. . . .
When we consider the nature of these
courts, we must conclude that their
effect and operation will be utterly to
destroy the state governments; for
they will be the judges how far their
laws will operate. They are to modify
their own courts, and you can make
no state law to counteract them. The
discrimination between their judicial
power, and that of the states, exists,
therefore, but in name. To what
disgraceful and dangerous length
does the principle of this go! . . . (3
Elliott, 521–22; italics added).
Obviously, as far as Mason was concerned,
a plot was afoot to use the judiciary as an
instrument for imposing nationalization:
The principle itself goes to the
destruction of the legislation of
the states, whether or not it was
intended. As to my own opinion, I
most religiously and conscientiously
believe that it was intended (ibid.).
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In his brief response to Mason, Madison
more or less conceded the extraordinary
powers granted to the judiciary:
It may be a misfortune that, in
organizing any government, the
explication of its authority should be
left to any of its coordinate branches.
There is no example in any country
where it is otherwise. There is a new
policy of submitting it to the judiciary
of the United States (3 Elliott, 532;
italics in the original).
Monarchy had limited the power to explicate
and make a final determination upon laws
to the executive branch (i.e., itself), and
the Articles of Confederation had taken
Blackstone to the limit by having shifted
this ultimate power to the legislative branch.
Madison had sought during the Convention
to prevent bias in either direction, but now,
he acknowledged, however grudgingly, the
explication and final determination of laws
would be assigned neither to executive nor
legislative authority, but to the judiciary,
and for the first time in the history of
western civilization. In effect, he suggested
here that the primary achievement of the
Convention, though almost entirely kept
from debate throughout its proceedings,
was the imposition of judicial review to
guarantee federal sovereignty.
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Because of his personal experience on
the Committee of Detail, Randolph had even
more reason than Mason to doubt the use
of the judiciary implied by the Constitution.
At the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
Randolph declared, “The judiciary is drawn
up in terror— here I have an objection of
a different nature. I object to the appellate
jurisdiction as the greatest evil in it [the
Constitution]” (3 Farrand, 310). Like Mason
and Gerry, Randolph had refused to sign
the Constitution, but he was convinced
by Washington, Madison, and others to
reverse himself, probably in exchange for his
appointment as our nation’s first Attorney
General in order to appease the opposition.
Nevertheless, he remained dubious of the
provision for appellate jurisdiction—exactly
the feature of Article III left unresolved by
the Committee of Detail.
In comparable fashion, Luther Martin,
the original author of the supremacy clause,
solemnly warned at the Maryland ratifying
convention against nationalization resulting
from Rutledge’s amendment to this clause:
. . . it [the Constitution] is now worse
than useless, for being so altered
as to render the treaties and laws
made under the federal government
superior to our [state] constitution,
if the system is adopted it will
amount to a total and unconditional
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surrender of that government, by
the citizens of this state, of every
right and privilege secured to them
by our [state] constitution, and an
express compact and stipulation with
the general government that it may,
at its discretion, make laws in
direct violation of those rights (3
Farrand, 287).
Later confiding his doubts about the
intentions of his fellow delegates at the
Convention, Martin warned, “I most sacredly
believe their object is the total abolition
and destruction of all state governments,
and the erection on their ruins of one great
and extensive empire” (3 Farrand, 291). In
retrospect, Martin’s expectation turned out
to be justified, whether of not the proponents
of judicial review had this particular outcome
in mind. As Martin anticipated, an enlarged
judiciary did eventually help to integrate the
separate states into what could only have
seemed an empire, if with more acceptable
results than he anticipated.
The expanded powers of the judiciary
likewise took on central importance when
the Judiciary Act was debated in Congress
during the summer of 1789. However, the
specific issue of judicial review seems to
have been largely ignored. Senators opposed
to the Judiciary Act included Richard Henry
Lee and William Maclay, both of whom
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expressed their concerns without referring to
judicial review. During debate in the House
of Representatives later in the summer,
elaborate speeches by Smith, Livermore,
and Stone emphasized the general threat of
an expanded court system, but also without
referring to judicial review. In a rambling
speech, James Jackson of Georgia more
specifically warn against judicial review,
but his diatribe stirred no response beyond
Sherman’s quick and somewhat elusive
assurance that “uniformity of decision would
be guaranteed” (34 Annals, 6–7).
On the other hand, Fisher Ames, who
had not attended the Convention, eloquently
defended the need for a Judiciary Act
without mentioning judicial review, and even
Madison and Gerry, former opponents at the
Convention, supported a stronger judiciary
with a few sentences apiece again without
mentioning judicial review. They seem to
have swallowed their opposition, thereby
joining the strategy of silence begun at the
Convention. Though they might have strayed
into the discussion of judicial review in their
personal conversations, they refrained from
doing so in their speeches before the House
of Representatives as reported in the Annals.
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VIII.
The Judiciary Act
Among the six delegates who
had promoted judicial review at the
Constitutional Convention, Wilson and
Rutledge were appointed to the Supreme
Court, and Sherman was elected to the
House of Representatives. The remaining
three—Ellsworth, Johnson, and Paterson—
were elected to the Senate, where the
Judiciary Act was drawn up as specified by
Madison’s compromise and the exceptions
and regulations clause Article III, Section 2,
of the Constitution.
The central figure in the passage of
the Judiciary Act turns out to have been
Ellsworth, who was chosen with Paterson
and six others (with two more added six
days later) to serve on the ad hoc committee
for drafting the Judiciary Act, described as
Senate Bill No.1. This was the first such
committee appointed by the new Senate,
and its formation was the very first order of
business on the first day of its First Session.
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Truly, the Judiciary Act was at the top of the
Senate’s agenda at its very inception in 1789.
Former Convention delegates appointed to
this committee included, besides Ellsworth
and Paterson, Richard Bassett of Delaware,
William Few of Georgia, Caleb Strong of
Massachusetts, and Paine Wingate of New
Hampshire.
Ellsworth himself was elected to serve
as chairman of this committee. He already
composed his own preliminary draft of the
Judiciary Act preceding the version of the
drafting subcommittee on which he served,
as indicated by his letter to Judge Richard
Law on April 30, twelve days before this
subcommittee was chosen. Here he sketched
out many of the provisions later found in
the committee’s original draft (Brown, 185;
Warren’s “History,” 60–61). Portions of the
original draft survive in the handwriting of
Ellsworth, Paterson, and Strong—Sections 1
to 9 in Paterson’s handwriting, Sections 10 to
23 in Ellsworth’s, and Section 24 in Strong’s
(Warren, “History,” 50). The rest, including
Section 25, survive in the handwriting of a
clerk.
One can assume that Ellsworth himself
authored Section 25 in its original draft,
since a clerk would not have been able to
belabor its content to such an extreme. The
imposition of judicial review is, arguably,
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the initial bulwark of federal sovereignty in
the history of constitutional law.
Ellsworth led Senate debate in support
of the Judiciary Act through June and
the first half of July, and his persistent
defense of its wording is reported to have
been extraordinarily aggressive. His primary
responsibility for the Act was acknowledged
in several entries of William Maclay’s journal,
the only systematic record that survives of
Senate proceedings. Maclay emphasized
Ellsworth’s singular role perhaps most
emphatically in his remark, “This vile bill is
a child of his [Ellsworth’s], and he defends
it with the care of a parent, even with wrath
and anger” (Maclay, 91; also 94, 101, and
152). In 1836, Madison also singled out
Ellsworth as the author of the Judiciary Act:
It may be taken for certain that the bill
organizing the judicial department
originated in his [Ellsworth’s] draft,
and that it was not materially changed
in its passage into law (Brown, 185).
Among opponents to the Act, Ellsworth
was cast as the principal villain, and the
Judiciary Act as a dangerous nationalist
takeover strategy—in Maclay’s words, the
American equivalent to the gunpowder
conspiracy.
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In retrospect, it can be recognized that
Ellsworth quickly took a dominant role in
the Senate regarding other issues as well.
He forced the passage of every feature in
Hamilton’s economic program except for
those minor changes he himself felt were
important. He sponsored Madison’s Bill of
Rights in the Senate and singlehandedly
sponsored and forced the passage of
legislation which pressured Rhode Island into
joining the union despite heavy opposition
by a majority of its citizens. John Adams
praised Ellsworth as “the firmest pillar of
his [Washington’s] whole administration in
the Senate,” and Aaron Burr complained, “If
Ellsworth had happened to spell the name of
the Deity with two d’s, it would have taken
the Senate three weeks to expunge the
superfluous letter” (Brown, 231, 225).
Why, then, did Ellsworth make the
Judiciary Act his very first task in the
Senate? Why was this his dominant concern?
The answer seems evident that he treated
the Constitution as unfinished business
without the Judiciary Act and that he swiftly
worked to bring it to its completion. Because
of his experience on the Committee of Detail,
he was the most qualified in the Senate to
promote the Judiciary Act, and he knew
exactly what needed to be done.
Now that the Constitution had passed
muster at the state ratifying conventions,
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its less attractive enabling features could
be imposed, the most important of which
was judicial review permitted by the vertical
organization of state and federal judiciaries.
The Constitution itself had provided a
central government based on an elaborate
model of checks and balances, and now,
with the Judiciary Act, this government
would be able to defend its sovereignty
through an interlocking hierarchy of state
and federal courts with a Supreme Court at
the top able to revoke state laws in conflict
with the Constitution. It was thus the
passage of the Judiciary Act that gave teeth
to the Constitution and helped to extricate
the nation from its powerlessness under the
Articles of Confederation.
Amazingly, all references to the
principle of judicial review were buried in
the 25th section of the Judiciary Act and
spelled out in just two sentences, the first an
elaborate and almost indecipherable 307word explanation of the procedures of judicial
review, and the second a brief amendment
added during Senate debate which limited
the application of judicial review to issues
featured in the written opinions of lower
courts. The heart of the Judiciary Act lay
in the first of these two sentences, since it
outlined the circumstances and procedures
for appealing state Supreme Court decisions
upon state law to the federal Supreme Court
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for its final determination. Probably drafted
by Ellsworth, this overlooked keystone (and
linchpin) of constitutional law defied both
revision and effective opposition, and this
was undoubtedly its principal value in
declaring the application of judicial review
without submitting it to debate. For in fact it
was neither discussed nor amended by either
the Senate or House of Representatives.
Members of the latter body later proposed a
number of changes for other portions of the
Judiciary Act, but none that was relevant to
this particular sentence, perhaps the most
important—certainly the most gnarled—
provision in the history of constitutional law.
Independent of the Constitution first
authored by Ellsworth and four others on
the Committee of Detail, the Judiciary Act
established the only enforceable defense of
our nation’s sovereignty, of necessity based
on the vertical organization of state and
federal courts. The labyrinthine precision
of this remarkable sentence guaranteed its
obscurity in simultaneously specifying the
function of judicial review and crowding from
recognition the enormous powers conferred
by the wording italicized here:
[Be it enacted,] That a final judgment
or decree in any suit, in the highest
court of law or equity of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be
had, where is drawn in question the
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validity of a treaty or statute of, or an
authority exercised under, the United
States, and the decision is against
their validity; or where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute
of, or an authority exercised under,
any state, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such
their validity, or where is drawn in
question the construction of any
clause of the constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission
held under, the United States, and
the decision is against the title, right,
privilege, or exemption, specially set
up or claimed by either party, under
such clause of the said Constitution,
treaty, statute or commission, may
be reexamined, and reversed or
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon a writ of error,
the citation being signed by the chief
justice, or judge or chancellor of
the court rendering or passing the
judgment or decree complained of, or
by a justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the same manner
and under the same regulations, and
the writ shall have the same effect as
if the judgment or decree complained
of had been rendered or passed in
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a circuit court, and the proceedings
upon the reversal shall also be the
same, except that the Supreme Court,
instead of remanding the cause for
a final decision as before provided,
may, at their discretion, if the cause
shall have been once remanded
before, proceed to a final decision
of the same, and award execution
[italics added].
Experienced judges and constitutional
historians may have been able to fathom
the process of judicial review described in
this context. However, most laymen could
only have been puzzled by the wording. Even
today, reputable constitutional historians
seem unaware of the full scope of powers
conferred by it.
Close scrutiny, however, reveals that
three legal clauses were embedded in this
sentence, respectively submitting,
•

Federal laws and treaties,

•

State laws, and

•

The constitutional
individual parties,

rights

of

to a process of judicial review that originates
in state courts and can then be appealed
to the Supreme Court. It turns out that the
veto of international treaties by state and
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federal courts has never been exercised,
while the veto of federal law did not gain
general acceptance until the 1803 Marbury
v. Madison decision.
Of immediate importance, however,
was the second clause, the veto of state laws,
since it guaranteed federal sovereignty over
the separate states. Amazingly, one hundred
and fifty-six words separate its compound
subject (“final judgment or decree”) from
its compound verb (“be reexamined, and
reversed or affirmed”). If all intervening
qualifications can be ignored, an inner
syntax emerges expressing the simple
principle in exactly the same words:
. . . that a final judgment . . . in the
highest court of law . . . of a State
. . . where is drawn in question
the validity of a statute . . . on the
ground of [its] being repugnant to the
constitution . . . and the decision is in
favor of such their validity . . . may be
reexamined, and reversed . . . by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Even more simply translated, the
favorable review of state law by state supreme
courts could be reversed by the federal
Supreme Court. A relatively brief sentence to
this effect could easily have been inserted in
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, but
to do so prematurely would have guaranteed
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the rejection of the Constitution as a whole
in either the Convention or the state ratifying
conventions the following year.
On the other hand, if a state supreme
court rejects a law as being unconstitutional,
there is nothing the federal Supreme Court
can do about it. The state supreme court’s
decision stands as having been decided.
Only if the state supreme court accepts this
law as being constitutional can its decision
be appealed to the federal Supreme Court for
its final decision. A substantial compromise
was thus brought into play. State courts
retained an initial negative power over state
laws, but if and when they exercised positive
support for these laws, the federal Supreme
Court was able to exercise negative power at
a final level. As a result the federal Supreme
Court seemed relatively impotent at the time,
but cumulative weight of its decisions over
the following decades substantially enlarged
its authority.
Everything was finally in place:
Rutledge’s August 23 amendment to the
supremacy clause had permitted state
courts to judge the constitutionality of
state laws, and Johnson’s August 27
amendment to Article III had guaranteed
the Supreme Court’s comparable powers.
Now Section 25 established the procedures
and circumstances for appealing state
court decisions to the Supreme Court. As
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Wilson’s August 27 amendment would have
done, Section 25 bridged the gap between
the two earlier amendments, specifically
by providing for the use of a writ of error
signed by a justice of the Supreme Court
for challenging favorable decisions by
state courts at the federal level. This was
a bold innovation—both too detailed and
too dangerous to have been included in the
Constitution.
It has been suggested that the
assignment of original jurisdiction to state
courts and appellate jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court was a concession to antifederalists such as Richard Henry Lee.
However, the exclusive use of state courts
in the first instance had been featured as
early as Rutledge’s June 5 amendment, and
it seems probable that Ellsworth was both
willing and eager to bring this arrangement
into the Judiciary Act. Anti-nationalists
could take satisfaction in having granted
state courts the power to initiate judicial
review, but, as recognized by Yates, Mason
and Martin, such an arrangement contained
the seeds of even greater powers accruing to
the Supreme Court over subsequent decades
based on its cumulative authority.
Fortunately, few fathomed the full
implications of Ellsworth’s sentence
reduced to its essential components. Unlike
the elegant lucidity of the Constitution’s
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final draft crafted by Gouverneur Morris,
Ellsworth’s tangled syntax repelled attention
in the very act of establishing the federal
government’s defense of its sovereignty
through judicial review. The resulting opacity
seems to have been typical of Ellsworth’s
legal style and was later ridiculed by Maclay
because it resisted amendment except by
imposing completely new wording:
This bill [a later bill upon consuls and
vice-consuls] was drawn and brought
in by Elsworth, and, of course, he
hung like a bat to every particle of it.
The first clause was a mere chaos—
style, preamble, and enacting clause
all jumbled together. It was really
unamendable; at least, the shortest
way to amend it was to bring in a new
one (Maclay, 368–69).
The problem, Maclay suggested, very likely
resulted from a peculiar lopsidedness
in Ellsworth’s talents: “All-powerful and
eloquent in debate, he is, notwithstanding,
a miserable draftsman.”
In Section 25 of the Judiciary Act,
Ellsworth apparently exceeded himself as
a miserable draftsman, but with salutary
results, since judicial review was far less
likely to be challenged and rejected than
if explained in a simpler construction. The
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Constitution itself had been gracefully
elucidated for the benefit of the American
public. In contrast, the wording of Section
25 was delayed two years and then smuggled
aboard in this fashion, an obscure rider to
an elaborate bill for creating inferior courts
as provided by Article III of the Constitution.
President Washington signed the
Judiciary Act on September 24, 1789, just
two years after the Constitution was adopted,
and it effectively complemented Articles III
and VI of the Constitution. The contents of
the Judiciary Act were both too elaborate
and too controversial to be brought into the
Constitution except as a kind of appendix
provided by the Judiciary Act. But in the
end everything more or less fit.
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution
had broadly assigned to Congress the task
of giving the Supreme Court “appellate
jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact with
such Exceptions and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.” With such
generous latitude, the Judiciary Act could
be framed to impose the vertical integration
of state and federal supreme courts. The
initial review of both state and federal laws
was limited to state courts, and their final
acceptance on constitutional grounds could
only be provided by the federal Supreme
Court once state supreme courts had found
them acceptable. Those laws rejected by
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state supreme courts could not be appealed
to the Supreme Court. This concession might
seem to have reinforced states rights, but at
last the federal government acquired what
might be described as defensible sovereignty
based on the Supreme Court’s authority to
dispense final judgments.
As to be expected, this system was
initially weak—so weak, in fact, that John
Jay, the first Chief Justice, resigned in
disgust in 1795. Only a half dozen cases
required judicial review by the Supreme
Court in the decade following the passage of
the Judiciary Act. Nevertheless, the gradual
accumulation of judicial decisions since
then has indeed expanded the veto of the
federal judiciary over state and local laws,
and to such an extent that Supreme Court
rulings today bear a mounting influence on
every aspect of life in the United States.
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IX.
Marbury v. Madison
According to most accounts it was
Chief Justice John Marshall who primarily
enlarged judicial review as the keystone
and final ingredient in our nation’s legal
system as late as 1803, sixteen years after
the Constitution was ratified. By declaring
the Supreme Court’s power of review over
federal law in Marbury v. Madison (1 Cranch,
174), Marshall is said to have established
the use of judicial review for ascertaining
the constitutional validity of laws passed
by Congress, thereby putting its “negative”
possibilities into effect. However, Marshall’s
horizontal use of judicial review relevant to
congressional law can also be seen as an
essential enlargement of Ellsworth’s earlier
achievement, which primarily involved the
vertical use of judicial review in determining
the constitutionality of state laws.
Both applications of judicial review
were crucial, and both posed difficulties
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of their own in their formulation. Whereas
Ellsworth’s use of judicial review in order to
defend federal sovereignty can be described
as having been somewhat duplicitous,
Marshall’s Supreme Court decision to
augment executive constraint on populist
excesses turns out to have been fraught
with a variety of potential legal violations
worthy of challenge. Moreover, Marshall’s
argument depended on the unavoidable
status of the Judiciary Act as being less
authoritative than the Constitution itself, an
argument that could have equally applied
to all other portions of the Judiciary Act
inclusive of Section 25 if it could be found
in potential contradiction with any portion
of the Constitution.
In any case, Marshall’s gambit
was successful in having completed the
establishment of judicial review as the
nation’s bulwark of legal deliberations
at all levels of government and among a
selection of the nation’s leadership relatively
free of political bias. The judiciary became
truly as powerful as the legislative and
executive branches, whatever the intrinsic
contradictions of Marshall’s interpretation.
If its unique authority was not necessarily
declared by the Constitution itself, it should
have been.
Marshall specifically achieved this aim
by denying the Supreme Court the right to
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issue a writ of mandamus. Established by
Section 13 in the Judiciary Act, the writ
was not included in the Constitution itself
and was therefore presumably restricted
to the affairs of inferior courts as indicated
by Article III’s exclusionary wording (“in all
other cases,” etc.). The Constitution took
precedence over the Judiciary Act (a mere
law), Marshall explained, so he was obliged
to declare Section 13 null and void. He
accordingly announced his inability to issue
a writ of mandamus that would force James
Madison, Jefferson’s new Secretary of State,
to employ William Marbury, a last-minute
political appointee of John Adams.
The immediate victory went to Madison,
but on more basic grounds the Marbury v.
Madison decision was a stunning defeat
for his vision of constitutional checks
and balances, since it risked the vertical
application of judicial review in order to set
the stage for the acceptance of the Supreme
Court’s final and irreversible power to veto
federal law as well as state law. During the
Convention, Madison had tried to prevent
any expansion of judicial authority that
would make the Supreme Court the final
arbiter of federal law and had expressed
his serious reservations when Johnson
added his amendment referring to the
Constitution itself. Now Madison’s worst
suspicions were confirmed, and, ironically,

172

in a case decided in his favor. Nevertheless,
as Marshall pointed out, only the Supreme
Court possessed the ability and credentials
to determine the constitutional validity
of specific federal laws. If it made its
determination unfavorable to these laws,
its negative opinion necessarily constituted
their veto for being unconstitutional.
Nor can it be overlooked that Article III
prohibited Marshall from declaring Section
13 unconstitutional without awaiting the
appeal of its favorable review from inferior
courts to the Supreme Court. Enforcing
the writ of mandamus for the benefit of
Marbury was entirely within Marshall’s
original jurisdiction, but his jurisdiction
was appellate, not original, when it came to
rejecting the writ for being unconstitutional.
A decision supportive of the writ would
first have been needed from a state
supreme court, as provided by Section 25
of the Judiciary Act, and then it could be
appealed to the Supreme Court for its final
dispensation. But most important, Marshall
denied Congress its right to incorporate the
writ of mandamus into the Judiciary Act as
justified by the exceptions and regulations
clause of Article III: “. . . with such exceptions,
and under such regulations as the congress
shall make” (italics added).
Amazingly, Marshall dispensed with this
entire phrase, featured by the Committee of
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Detail to provide for enlarging the authority
of the Supreme Court, as “mere surplusage”
and “entirely without meaning” (Commager,
193). However, only four sentences later, at
a different stage in his argument, Marshall
declared, “It cannot be presumed, that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be
without effect.” Indeed, he was correct here,
but at the expense of his earlier argument
against Congress’s authority to include the
writ of mandamus in the Judiciary Act. If
an “effect,” or intended application, were
perceived in the exceptions and regulations
clause rejected by Marshall, Section
13’s guidelines for imposing the writ of
mandamus could be recognized to have
been fully constitutional as an “exception”
that Congress had chosen to make if, in fact,
it were any exception at all.
Finally, of course, Marshall should
have disqualified himself from judging the
case, since he had served as Secretary of
State in the final months of the Adams
administration and had been personally
responsible for the delay in giving Marbury
his last-minute federal appointment. To this
extent, at least, the litigation had arisen
from negligence on Marshall’s part, and yet
he sat in judgment on the case!
Nevertheless, it can be acknowledged
in retrospect that the defects and fallacies
in Marshall’s judgment against the writ of
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mandamus were less important than his
defense of the right of the Supreme Court
to impose such a judgment, whatever its
flaws. By declaring the writ of mandamus
unconstitutional, he established by example
the inevitability of judicial review over federal
law additional to state law. As originally
intended, judicial review had been no more
than implied in the Constitution, but its use
was unavoidable as Marshall explained, and
as Johnson and fellow delegates had planned
when they added the “arising under” clause
to Article III.
Among other potential contradictions
was Marshall’s veto of the writ of mandamus
without having taken into account the
comparable status of the writ of error for
making appeals to the Supreme Court as
required by Section 25. Both writs were
missing from the list of powers granted by
Article III, and both were first specified in
the Judiciary Act, so both could have been
declared unconstitutional by Marshall’s
logic. In other words, the judicial review of
state laws—vastly more important than the
writ of mandamus—was no less susceptible
to veto, as in fact Marshall himself argued
when he had appeared as a lawyer before
the Supreme Court in 1796 (Ware v.
Hylton, 3 Dallas 199). However, now that
he was elevated to Chief Justice, Marshall
understandably wanted to preserve the
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vertical review of state law as well as adding
its horizontal application to federal law. As
a result, the intentional ambiguity of Article
III pertained to both writs, but with entirely
different implications leading to identical
results.
Because there was no indication
whether state or federal inferior courts
would be used, Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act, including the writ of error, could be
accepted as being constitutional, permitting
the Supreme Court’s judicial review of state
laws. However, because of the exclusionary
wording used to convey this ambiguity (“in
all other cases,” etc.), Section 13, including
the writ of mandamus, could be found
unconstitutional, thereby establishing the
necessity of judicial review for federal law
too. Paradoxically, it was only by reducing
the Supreme Court’s authority that Marshall
could enlarge this authority to impose such
a reduction.
A double standard seems to have been
imposed, in both instances favorable to
judicial review. In effect, Marshall denied
the Supreme Court the right to use the writ
of mandamus because it had incidentally
been excluded from the Constitution. But in
rejecting it he laid claim to another and more
important right, the judicial review of federal
law, a right that had been intentionally left
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open to interpretation so it could later be
imposed.
As to be expected, this mixture of
potentially contradictory assumptions was
susceptible to challenge. In the 1816 Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee case (1 Wheat, 304)
and the 1821 Cohens v. Virginia case (6
Wheat, 264), the Virginia Court of Appeals
declared Section 25 unconstitutional on the
grounds, apparently consistent with the
original intent of the Constitution, that state
judiciaries possessed independent authority
to interpret the Constitution for themselves.
In both cases the Supreme Court reversed
their decision based on the arguments of
Joseph Story and Marshall that its appellate
jurisdiction was unavoidable except for
those cases in which it exercised original
jurisdiction.
True, there was no reference to the
vertical integration of state and federal courts
in the Constitution, but, as first intended,
there was likewise no word or phrase in the
Constitution which prohibited its adoption.
And if the jurisdictions of state and federal
courts were coextensive and integrated, the
same principle of contradiction applied as
explained in Marbury v. Madison, to the
effect that both state and federal laws could
be vetoed when found in conflict with the
Constitution. In other words, by the principle
of omission state and federal courts could
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be integrated, and then by the principle of
negation (Marshall’s dictum, “Affirmative
words are often, in their operation, negative
of other objects than those affirmed”), state
laws found in conflict with the Constitution
could be declared null and void. By logic
alone, centralization prevailed.
Ill and in retirement when Marbury
v. Madison was decided, Ellsworth had
perhaps even more reason than Madison
to be ambivalent about Marshall’s line of
argument, since he had played a central
role in framing both documents Marshall
found in conflict with each other. Marshall
extended judicial review to federal law by
misconstruing the exclusionary wording of
Article III, which Ellsworth helped to draft,
and Marshall did this in order to reject Section
13 of the Judiciary Act, whose original draft
still exists in Ellsworth’s handwriting. In and
of itself, the writ of mandamus was relatively
inconsequential, but it was indeed missing
from the Constitution, so Marshall could
use its absence to compel its exclusion from
the powers exercised by the Supreme Court.
By later specifying its use in the Judiciary
Act, Ellsworth had ostensibly contradicted
himself, and Marshall could use this
potential inconsistency as the precedent
he needed to justify the judicial review of
federal law.
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Whether Marshall’s interpretation was
correct did not deprive him of the right to
make it. Ellsworth himself had imposed
the Judiciary Act in order to guarantee
the Supreme Court’s power to review state
laws, and now Marshall challenged a very
minor portion of this Act in order to help
consolidate another of Ellsworth’s principal
objectives (as specified by the first clause
of the Judiciary Act), the Supreme Court’s
power to review federal laws. So how could
Ellsworth complain? Everything was finally
in place, more or less.
A makeshift pragmatism had, in fact,
been Ellsworth’s primary asset throughout
the Constitutional Convention and his
subsequent career in government. With
disdain, Maclay had ridiculed Ellsworth’s
dependence on caballing, the use of quiet
negotiations in the halls of Congress as a
supplement to the public eloquence then
expected in legislative deliberations (Maclay,
105). However, it was only by caballing that
trade-offs could be made, and these tradeoffs were essential compromises toward the
formation of our government. To help impose
the Connecticut Compromise, Ellsworth had
twice assumed the distasteful responsibility
of addressing the Convention in support of
the inclusion of slavery in the Constitution.
Also in the spirit of compromise he had
participated in the tactic of omitting any
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reference to the identity of inferior courts
by the Committee of Detail on which he
had served. Later, with the Judiciary Act,
he had likewise given state courts exclusive
original jurisdiction to offset the exclusive
final determination granted to the Supreme
Court. This might have seemed a generous
compromise to opponents of judicial review
but it later turned out to provide the Supreme
Court with judicial power unprecedented in
world history. And of course he participated
in the remarkable trade-off whereby the
passage of the Judiciary Act had been linked
with the passage of the Bill of Rights.
After obtaining the passage of the
Judiciary Act in the Senate, Ellsworth
sponsored the Bill of Rights in the Senate
and worked vigorously for its passage, just
as Madison did for judicial review in the
House of Representatives. The two were
obviously intended to work in coordination
with each other. The Judiciary Act gave
the Supreme Court its full legal authority,
while the Bill of Rights limited this authority
relevant to the needs and circumstances of
individual citizens as well as state and local
governments. The two pieces of legislature
fit like a glove.
As the de facto Senate majority
leader throughout Washington’s term in
office, Ellsworth was able to guarantee full
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support for Washington and Hamilton’s
Federalist agenda as compared to sustained
dissension in the House of Representatives.
In the opinion of John Adams, Washington’s
principal mistake at the end of his presidency
was his elevation of Ellsworth to become the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, thereby
jeopardizing the Federalist Party’s legislative
dominance in the Senate, at that time a
more important arena during the inception
of the United States.
After a couple years of judicial inactivity,
Ellsworth resigned from the Supreme Court
to lead a delegation to France in order to
negotiate terms with Napoleon in order
to avoid the possibility of naval warfare.
Ellsworth and his team spent a year in
friendly arbitration in Paris, and for a while
he was even considered a potential substitute
for Adams in the next presidential election.
However, the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts
provoked a hostile public reaction that made
any federalist victory unlikely, whoever the
candidate might have been. Also, Ellsworth’s
concessions to Napoleon in their 1800 treaty
compounded public hostility against the
Federalists to such an extent that Jefferson
won the presidency by an even greater
margin than might otherwise have been the
case. Three years later, however, it turned
out that these concessions might well have
helped to inspire Napoleon’s sudden and
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presumably inexplicable “giveaway” sale of
the Louisiana Territory to the United States
despite his dislike of Jefferson. Suddenly the
United States was twice its earlier size, and,
if there was any connection, Ellsworth’s
ability to compromise once again paid
substantial dividends.
In the end, however, the sacrifice of
the writ of mandamus in order to impose
the Supreme Court’s horizontal check upon
Congress was the most bizarre compromise
linked with Ellsworth’s role, and Marshall
rather than Ellsworth himself obtained it.
Undoubtedly conspiracy was involved, but
its outcome was truly accidental, at least on
Ellsworth’s part.

182

183

X.
Conclusion
In retrospect, the accomplishment
of Ellsworth and his fellow delegates was
somewhat different from Madison’s primary
objectives at the Convention, but with
modifications that may be considered to
have led to a more viable system.
Madison wanted to subordinate
individual states to the sovereignty of the
federal government led by disinterested
statesmen dedicated to the rule of law. For
this purpose he sought a uni-dimensional
hierarchy with the President and Supreme
Court at the top and with state legislatures
at the bottom. Congress would play
an intermediate role by checking state
legislatures while being checked itself by
a Council of Revision. However, as already
indicated, Madison’s structural plan was
decisively rejected by the Convention, and it
seemed to many during the early stages of
the Convention that the Constitution would
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be no more binding upon state legislation
than the Articles of Confederation had
been. Instead, by makeshift arrangement
the coalition of dissident delegates provided
the federal government with its needed
sovereignty by giving the federal Supreme
Court the needed appellate jurisdiction to
review both federal law and state supreme
court decisions bearing upon state law.
Central authority was thus salvaged, but by
use of the judiciary rather than Congress
and within a vertical integration from state
legislatures to state and federal courts.
In effect, the federal Supreme Court
replaced the Council of Revision in
curtailing the authority of state legislatures.
Somewhat diminished by this arrangement
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as compared to Madison’s plan was the
participation of the other two primary federal
branches—Congress deprived of authority
over state law and the president deprived of
authority as a co-partner with members of
the Supreme Court on a Council of Revision.
Procedurally, it was more convenient to
give a single branch, the judiciary, the
power to veto both state and federal laws,
but Madison’s emphasis on checks and
balances was necessarily diminished by the
substitution.
The difference between Madison’s
model and the final model as determined by
the 1789 Judiciary Act followed by the 1803
Marbury v. Madison decision may be readily
diagrammed.

Model

me Court

Figure 2. The Final Model
President

Supreme Court

on

ew)

es

(Veto)

(Judicial
review)

Congress
State Supreme Courts
(Judicial
review)
State Legislatures

(Judicial
review)

186

The final model’s upper “V” portion
indicates the presidential veto as well as the
judicial review of federal law as confirmed
by Marshall’s 1803 Marbury v. Madison
opinion, while the vertical detour extending
from the Supreme Court to state supreme
courts and then state legislatures represents
the judicial review of state law as defined by
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act. As modified,
the counter -majoritarian veto became
workable, if asymmetrical and of relatively
precarious legitimacy.
It also turns out that the Supreme
Court’s power to review state law was
guaranteed by a federal law—the Judiciary
Act—that could be repealed or amended
any time by a simple majority of Congress.
Likewise, the judicial review of federal
law was guaranteed by a Supreme Court
opinion—Marbury v. Madison—that could
be supplanted or modified by later opinions
of the Supreme Court. Neither power
of review over state or federal law was
stated in the Constitution itself, nor was
either legitimized as an amendment to the
Constitution. Paradoxically, as a result, the
Constitution’s effectiveness as our nation’s
primary legal contract has been guaranteed
by a mere law and by a mere Supreme Court
decision, both of which lie outside the the
Constitution itself. As already indicated the
effect has been tautological—constitutional
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government has provided the basis for their
implementation; they in turn have served as
bulwarks confirming the central authority of
the Constitution to do so.
The importance of Marbury v. Madison
is generally recognized at least partly
because of the dramatic circumstances that
led to its adoption. However, the comparable
importance of the Judiciary Act has often
been overlooked in constitutional history,
apparently on the assumption that the
judicial review of state laws has been just as
effectively guaranteed by the Constitution’s
supremacy clause, by the 1803 Marbury v.
Madison decision, and by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
1868. However, without Section 25 of the
Judiciary Act, none of these documents
would have specifically granted the Supreme
Court the power to veto state laws.
For example, without Section 25 the
supremacy clause could actually have been
interpreted to deprive the Supreme Court of
its final power to exercise judicial review. As
first intended by Martin, state oath of loyalty
to the Constitution would have established
their full authority to overturn state laws
without further review by any particular
branch of the federal government. Section
25 reversed this possibility by imposing an
appeals system whose final authority was
vested in the Supreme Court alone.
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Marbury v. Madison was even less
useful in guaranteeing the Supreme Court
the power of judicial review over state law.
Marshall’s decision did affirm the Supreme
Court’s power of judicial review over laws
passed by Congress, but it bore no relevance
whatsoever to the veto of state law.
Finally, the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment significantly
expanded the Supreme Court’s authority to
protect individual rights from both state and
federal government. However, without the
Judiciary Act the Supreme Court would not
necessarily have exercised final authority
in this matter. State courts could have held
coextensive and essentially independent
authority, and their decisions could have
retained independent validity as guaranteed
by their judges’ oath of allegiance to the
United States as required by the supremacy
clause. There was no clear guarantee that the
Supreme Court could have reversed these
decisions, any more than state courts could
have reversed the Supreme Court’s findings.
Even if the broadest interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
clause were granted, Section 25 provided an
indispensable antecedent and established
the procedures and circumstances by
which judicial review at the state level could
be appealed for a final judgment by the
Supreme Court. Nowadays little more than
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an unexplored dark hole in the history of
American jurisprudence, the Judiciary Act
was at the core of our nation’s difficult but
ultimately successful unification.
As for the Bill of Rights, it too became
dependent on judicial review as guaranteed
by Section 25. In the First Congress of 1789,
Madison promoted the Bill of Rights as a
protection of individual and states rights from
federal interference as might be exerted by
the Supreme Court. As earlier indicated, just
as there was a balance of power among the
three branches of government, a secondary
twofold balance seems to have been
envisaged between the Judiciary Act and the
Bill of Rights. Both dominated proceedings
in the 1789 Congress—the Judiciary Act
promoted by Ellsworth in the Senate, and
the Bill of Rights promoted by Madison in
the House of Representatives. Their linkage
effectively established symmetry between
the federal government’s power of judicial
review and the defense of personal and
communal liberties from all branches of
the federal government, the Supreme Court
included.
The First Amendment’s guarantee of
free speech, for example, not only restricted
the federal government from curtailing
the free speech of individuals, but also
prevented it from interfering with state laws
and judicial decisions that either supported
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or limited free speech. If state laws curtailed
free speech, the Bill of Rights in its original
formulation prevented the Supreme Court,
Congress, or any other office of the federal
government from interfering with these laws
despite their review powers as guaranteed
by the Judiciary Act.
Unexpectedly, however, the equal
protection clause of the 1868 Fourteenth
Amendment subverted this intention by
expanding the Bill of Rights to protect
individual liberties from state and
local government as well as the federal
government. This turned out to be something
entirely different. The Bill of Rights became
a universal standard of justice, and the
Supreme Court necessarily assumed final
authority in enforcing its application at every
level of government inclusive of state and
local levels. For the first time, a single branch
of the federal government, the Supreme
Court, was empowered to prohibit all state
and local laws deemed unacceptable—even,
as it later turned out, individual, group,
and corporate practices found in conflict
with the Bill of Rights. Since virtually all
human intercourse somehow touches upon
freedoms designated by the Bill of Rights,
there was necessarily a substantial increase
in federal intrusiveness as justified by the
need to defend individual parties from state
and local governments, exactly what many
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of our founders had sought to prevent when
they first drafted the Bill of Rights.
Yet the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been beneficial. The
American public enjoys relative uniformity
in the rule of law, and the integrated
enforcement of the two countervailing
principles of judicial review (which is
essentially “counter -majoritarian”) and
of inalienable right (which is essentially
“egalitarian”) has helped to complete the
absorption of the separate states into a
single nation. Full nationalization has
been achieved through the Supreme
Court’s enlarged authority imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but necessarily
with a wide array of residual privileges still
in effect among all the states. The system
that has emerged might seem both crude
and redundant, but perhaps the best and
most pragmatic arrangement under the
circumstances.
How could this Rube Goldberg
contraption, this jerrybuilt hodgepodge
of reversible safeguards and potentially
incompatible laws, clauses, and judicial
decisions have become the foundation of
American constitutional law? At least in part
because the relatively simple design for a
central government sought by Madison and
his supporters had been prevented by antinationalist convention delegates, and it had
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been impossible under the circumstances
to impose any other alternative with
comparable safeguards against excessive
decentralization.
As disclosed by letters between
Washington and Hamilton, the Constitutional
Convention was in total disarray by early
July 1787 (3 Farrand, 534, 565–67). The
most important features of the Virginia
Plan were under attack, and prospects
seemed inevitable that the Constitution
would be just as ineffective as the Articles
of Confederation. Obviously, some kind
of a structure was necessary to veto state
laws incompatible with federal prerogatives.
Since congressional review was found
unacceptable, by default the role of the
judiciary became the focus of the effort to
salvage this responsibility. Yet the basic
powers eventually granted to the Supreme
Court by the Judiciary Act and Marbury v.
Madison had been too innovative, and too
threatening to many anti-nationalists, to
have been accepted at the Constitutional
Convention. These powers were therefore
excluded from proceedings, setting the
stage for their subsequent adoption on a
piecemeal basis. Having not been rejected,
they could later be imposed, paradoxically,
by granting state courts federal authority
in order to let the Supreme Court reverse
state court decisions, and by depriving the
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Supreme Court of a specific authority, the
writ of mandamus, in order to establish its
final authority, if so disposed, to risk making
such mistakes.
The piecemeal implementation of this
convoluted strategy necessarily involved
confusion, postponements, temporary
expedients, and unexpected compromises.
As might have been anticipated, it resulted
as much from serendipity as from planning
and synthesis. If an architectonic symmetry
emerged, its realization transcended its
frame and scaffolding. Like a thrown toy
gyroscope, the organization of our nation’s
courts stabilized and found its own path
independent of the energies that launched
it, yet more or less as intended when thrown.
Delegates who might have been willing to
impose judicial review “lucked into” the
creation of inferior courts because of the
June 5 Madison compromise. However,
there was little they could do beyond crafting
the language of Articles III and VI to permit
its later adoption. As a result, nobody at
the Convention could have predicted the
outcome with any degree of confidence.
Such individuals as Wilson, Ellsworth
and Hamilton sought a strong judiciary
based on the principle of judicial review,
while others such as Yates, Mason, Randolph
and Martin feared it—some of them longer
than others. But none of them wielded the
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power to shape with exactitude the system
of justice that would emerge over the next
two centuries. Ellsworth had more of a hand
than others in shaping the judiciary, but
his contribution was fraught with the most
contradictions.
Many basic questions remain
unanswered. Those contemporary statesmen
who painstakingly documented their
contributions to statecraft—Washington,
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Adams—did not
play central roles. In contrast, those who
helped to steer possibilities toward judicial
review neglected to explain themselves for
the benefit of posterity. Indeed, they seem
to have avoided fully exposing their ideas to
public scrutiny, and instead negotiated (or
caballed) in private. Like modern politicians,
they did not feel compelled to clarify their
objectives with the thoroughness that their
strategy might otherwise have necessitated.
Several were prevented from compiling their
papers at the end of their careers.
In Ellsworth’s case this might well
have been because of a prolonged terminal
illness resulting from effect of stormy seas
while crossing the Atlantic on his diplomatic
mission to France. Rutledge can be excused
because of incurable insanity (its onset
produced by his outrage with the Jay
mission to England suggested by Ellsworth
to Washington), and Wilson because of public
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disgrace as a fugitive from his creditors,
dying in the care of his young bride in an
obscure rural hotel. As a result, many of the
steps taken in implementing judicial review
can only be hypothetically reconstructed.
Some modifications were plainly intended,
but others seem to have resulted from the
happy mixture of experience and accident
first recommended by Dickinson.
Quite properly, opponents of the
Judiciary Act suspected by 1789 that
it contained the seeds of a nationalist
takeover, but they did not know where to
look. The issues they emphasized—trial by
jury, the relocation of trials, and an appeals
system based on fact as well as law—were
relatively harmless distractions. Moreover,
the Bill of Rights was adopted to safeguard
both state and individual rights from any
misuse of federal power, and the Judiciary
Act seemed to give state courts sufficient
authority to defend state sovereignty from
federal intrusion. Nevertheless, widespread
suspicions continued, and they were
justified. Unmentioned by the Constitution
and buried in Section 25 of the Judiciary
Act was the culprit, a tangled recipe for
judicial review that almost completely
went without notice at the time. With the
passage of the Act as a whole, this recipe
took effect, and, as predicted by Yates, the
trend toward unification could at last begin.
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The linchpin had been inserted and the
Constitution given its defensible supremacy
over state law. In statute as well as spirit,
the United States was no longer a loose
and powerless confederation, but a single
nation—eventually the most powerful in the
world.
Today, the Supreme Court’s ability
to check both state and federal law is
universally recognized. First intended to
defend the federal government’s sovereign
authority, judicial review has taken on much
broader applications, and with beneficial
results. The rule of law prevails, and those
who interpret it have been chosen based on
merit as well as possible in a democracy. As
predicted by Ellsworth at the Constitutional
Convention, the selection and lifetime service
of Supreme Court justices encourages both
competence and integrity in the context of
elective government. On the average wiser
and better educated than elected officials,
these justices have become our nation’s
guardians of last resort. When important
laws are at stake, their role is paramount.
There is no other nation in the history of
civilization, which has vested this much
power in its judiciary.
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